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INTRODUCTION
The setting is perfect for a Halloween night in the late 1800s. The
moon reappears from dense clouds, and hounds begin to howl. The wind is
wailing through the trees, making those frightening sounds that are man-
datory for every horror film. Sitting in the dark library of the "mandatory"
ancient manor is a wealthy but decrepit gentleman. An eccentric, old
grandfather is taking pleasure in revoking his will to completely disinherit
Elmer,' his overly anxious heir. Suddenly, there is a creaking sound
coming from the hail. The library doors burst open, and a loud gunshot
blasts through the room. The grandfather is dead, and his grandson Elmer
stands shaking with the smoking gun in his hand.
An open and shut case of murder? Probably. But the far more inter-
esting question is whether Elmer can inherit from his grandfather. Or,
put more generally, can a person who slays another prosper in any way
from the death of his or her victim? This was the basic issue presented in
Riggs v. Palmer. Relying on an ancient legal principle that a person can-
not benefit from his or her wrongdoing, and noting the lack of precedent
directly on point, the Riggs court denied the murderer his inheritance.3 The
Riggs decision opened the door to severe criticism, the critics claiming that
the court lacked authority to support its decision and that the court was
bound by statutory law which required that an heir inherit.4 As one
observer noted, however:
[t]his strange case was a new kettle of fish. Yet, it is clear from . . . [the]
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1. "Elmer" is the name of the defendant in Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506,22 N.E. 188(1889), in
which similar facts were presented. The introduction to this article was inspired by D'Amato, Elmer's
Rule: A Jurisprudential Dialogue, 60 IowA L. REv. 1129 (1975). Professor D'Amato creates a fictional
dialogue between Elmer and his attorney in which they discuss the question whether an heir under a will
would still get the property even if he killed the testator. The discussion was invented to investigate the
case of Riggs v. Palmer, an early American case that took the position that a murderer who was a
legatee could not take under his ancestor's will.
2. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
3. Because of the dearth of case law on point, the court in Riggs v. Palmer examined various
treatises, writings by such famous scholars as Aristotle and Blackstone, Roman law, and civil law; even
the Napoleonic Code and the Civil Code of Lower Canada were discussed. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y.
506, 511-13, 22 N.E. 188, 189-90 (1889).
4. See, e.g., Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 111. 180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914). Rejecting the Riggs decision,
the court stated that "where there are explicit rules governing the descent of property by stat-
ute .. . the one upon whom the law casts the property cannot, because of the murder by him of the
ancestor or testator, be divested of it by the court." Id. at 185, 106 N.E. at 787.
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opinion that the judge was revolted . . .by the notion that a murderer could
inherit under the will of the man he had murdered; ... [the judge] was
struggling to deny him, if he could even if he had to quote from the old
cookbook.5
The Riggs holding was especially surprising because it was inconsis-
tent with a case decided one year previously, Owens v. Owens.6 Confronted
with a murdering spouse, the Owens court refused to make an exception to
the statutory right to receive dower, stating that creating statutory excep-
tions is solely within the power of the legislature.7 Scholars studying the
Riggs decision have therefore instinctively asked, "[W]hat business does a
court have in surprising anyone?" 8 More importantly, what business does
anyone have in examining the succession laws of American courts in the
1880s? The answer is because the problem of a murdering heir or legatee
has never been adequately treated by courts or legislatures. 9 In fact, the
issue has distressed jurisprudential scholars from 1870 to the present.10
Therefore, the purpose of this Article is to examine the problems that
such slayers have presented to the courts and the fundamental legal
principles that have guided courts in their decisions. Additionally, this
discussion will outline the legislative response to the problem and analyze
the current status and trends of legislation on this subject. Finally, the
problems posed by legislative response will be examined and a statutory
solution to these problems will be proposed.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND-THE COURTS' RELUCTANCE
TO DENY A SLAYER'S INHERITANCE
Prior to any statutory prohibitions to the contrary, property passed
according to the ancient common law doctrines of attainder,1 forfeiture
and corruption of blood,1 2 and escheat.13 As a result, title to a felon's prop-
5. R. TRAVER, THE JEALOUS MISTRESS 65 (1967).
6. 100 N.C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888).
7. Id. at 242, 6 S.E. at 795.
8. D'Amato, Elmer's Rule: A Jurisprudential Dialogue, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1129 (1975).
9. Although attempts to solve the problem of the slayer and his bounty vary with jurisdictions,
the history of the problem is detailed in Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty-History of the Problem in
Anglo-American Law, 19 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 229 (1942).
10. Id. See note I supra.
11. Attainder is "that extinction of civil rights and capacities which took place whenever a
person who had committed treason or felony received [the] sentence of death for his crime." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 116 (5th ed. 1979). The effect of attainder is that the felon's estate is forfeited to the
sovereign. See Caldwell v. Hill, 179 Ga. 417,428, 176 S.E. 381,386 (1934). Although case lawis sparse
on the subject of forfeiture, there is no question that it was applied in cases of felonious conduct. In
Brookev. Warde, 3 Dyer 3lOb, 73 Eng. Rep. 702 (Q.B. 1572), a testator, by will, devised land to another
who later murdered the testator. The court, deciding the case on the question of oral revocation of the
will, described the devisee as one who "was attainted of murder, and hanged." Id. at 703. Blackstone's
list of the offenses that induce a forfeiture of lands and tenaments includes felony. 2 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 267 (3d ed. 1768).
12. Corruption of blood was part of the consequence of attainder. Under this doctrine, the
attainted person could not inherit property, retain the property he owned, or transmit property to heirs
by descent. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 311 (5th ed. 1979). See Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317,324, 18
N.E. 148, 150-51 (1888).
13. Added to the concepts of attainder and corruption of blood was the law of feudal escheat, in
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erty passed to the state. 14 This solved the problem of the slayer's bounty
because neither the slayer nor his heirs received the bounty. Furthermore,
the slayer lost any bounty he owned, and his family was left with nothing. 5
Criticism of these doctrines and the disappearance of the feudal
system that supported them led to the enactment of the Forfeiture Act of
1870, completely abolishing the doctrines.16 This Act provided that
"... [n]o confession, verdict, . . . conviction, orjudgment of or for any
treason . . . shall cause any attainder or corruption of blood, or any
forfeiture or escheat."' 7 Thus, in Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life
Association,'8 the court could not automatically apply the forfeiture
doctrine as had been done before passage of the act. In Cleaver, the wife's
administrator was allowed to recover insurance proceeds on the life of the
husband whom she had killed.19 The solution to the murdering heir
problem was, therefore, not as simple as it had been in the past; forfeiture
was no longer a viable solution, and judges had to look elsewhere for
support if they wanted to deny the slayer his bounty. This was the problem
presented in Owens v. Owens,20 in which the wife of the deceased was
convicted of being an accessory to his murder. The Owens court, unable to
apply the doctrines of attainder, forfeiture, or escheat, allowed the wife her
statutory right to dower. Troubled by the result, the court held that
while the law gives the dower . . . there is no provision for its
forfeiture for crime, however heinous it may be.'
The shocking result of allowing a slayer to share in the victim's
property did not convince most courts that the conclusion was not juris-
prudentially sound. In the absence of a statute, the majority of cases have
upheld such takings.22 Most courts adhering to this view have refused to
which the attainted felon breached the implied condition in the donation of the feud and forfeited the
property to the lord. See Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty-History of the Problem in Anglo-American
Law, 19 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rav. 229,230-34(1942). For a general discussion of collateral consequences of a
felony conviction in Illinois see Decker, Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction in Illinois, 56
CHI. KENT L. REv. 731 (1980).
14. A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE LAW OF WILLS
89 (1928).
15. One example of the atrocious results of attainder was the act of attainder passed in 1688 by
the Parliament of James II. See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 260 n.I
(1868). Under this act, approximately two to three thousand people were attainted for political rea-
sons; their property was confiscated and they were to be sentenced to death if they failed to appear at a
specific time. Id. "And, to render the whole proceeding as horrible in barbarity as possible, the list of
the prescribed was carefully kept secret until after the time fixed for their appearance." Id.
16. Forfeiture Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 23 (1870). Several earlier statutes had partially
abolished the application of these doctrines. For example, one statute provided that no attainder for
felony would take place except in such cases as the crime of High Treason, or of Petit Treason or
Murder. 54 Statutes-at-Large, c. 145, 742. Thus, the statute abolished forfeiture for felonies other than
those mentioned in it.
17. Forfeiture Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23.
18. 1 Q.B. 147 (1892).
19. Id.
20. 100 N.C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1889).
21. Id. at 241, 6 S.E. at 794.
22. T. ATKINSON, LAv OF WILLS 153 (2d ed. 1953). See McAllisterv. Fair, 72 Kan. 533,84 P. 112
(1906); Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N.W. 935 (1894); In re Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa.
203, 32 A. 637 (1895); Murchison v. Murchison 203 S.W. 423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
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make exceptions to the statutes of wills, descent and distribution, and, in
some instances, statutory dower.23 Other courts have refused to add
penalties to the commission of crime when criminal codes set out the
specific punishment for a particular crime. 4 Finally, some courts have
cited the United States Constitution's prohibition against forfeiture as the
reason for upholding a wrongdoer's taking.25 Yet, the grounds for refusing
to divert from statutory rules that dispose of property do not justify the
incongruant result of allowing slayers their bounty.
A. Judicial Legislation
An examination of various courts' decisions shows this reasoning to
be weak at best. First, there is a bit of old fashioned judicial reneging: the
"this is not my job; send it to the legislature" approach. Although the legal
philosophy dominant when our government was established did not
contemplate judicial legislation,26 times have changed and judges do
legislate.27 A good example of how times change and judicial decisions
correspondingly respond is case law on the right of privacy. In right of
privacy cases, courts have responded to changes in American society and
"the demands of the problems of the present day."28 The idea that a court
has a responsibility to consider the evolution of community attitudes when
making decisions is not a new one. In fact, the attempt of the American
legal system to adjust to far-reaching social and economic developments
has forced scholars to reconsider the concept of the judicial function.29
Courts legislate by overruling decisions; if not, such repulsive doc-
trines as "separate but equal" would still be haunting us. 30 Courts also
legislate when, for example, they find new individual rights under the
"penumbra" of the Bill of Rights.31 For example, the United States Su-
preme Court has stated:
[t]he association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill
of Rights. The right to educate a child in a school of the parent's choice-
23. T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS 153-54 (2d ed. 1953). See, e.g., Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 I11.
180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914); McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 P. 112 (1906).
24. Welsh v. James, 408 Ill. 18, 95 N.E.2d 872 (1950).
25. See, e.g., Welsh v. James, 408 Ill. 18, 95 N.E.2d 872 (1950). U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 3, cl. 2
provides that "Congress shall have power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of
Treason shall work corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted."
Cases which refuse to hold contrary to the Constitution include Crumley v. Hall, 202 Ga. 588, 43
S.E.2d 646 (1947), and Owens v. Owens, 100 N.C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1889).
26. F. CAHILL, JUDICIAL LEGISLATION V (1950).
27. Id.
28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973). Originally, our Constitution was based upon the
theory that judges merely apply the law, but do not create it. In the past seventy or eighty years,
however, there has developed an increasingly important body of legal theory which holds that judges
not only can legislate, but also ought consciously to do so. F. CAHILL, JUDICIAL LEGISLATION V (1950).
29. See F. CAHILL, JUDICIAL LEGISLATION (1950).
30. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
31. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
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whether public or private or parochial-is also not mentioned. Nor is the
right to study any particular subject or any foreign language. Yet the First
Amendment has been construed to include certain of those rights.
32
The first amendment did not cleverly hide these rights. Rather, the
Court ingeniously found them by examining ancient attitudes, the hippo-
cratic oath, the common law, English statutory law, American law, and the
positions of the American Medical Association, the American Public
Health Association, and the American Bar Association.33 If courts can
overrule decisions and find new constitutional rights, they can make
exceptions to statutory rules to prevent harsh and unjust results. The
Owens court could have responded to changes in circumstances, just as the
"privacy" cases have done. The change in the murdering heir circum-
stances was the abolishment of forfeiture. Instead, the court in Owens
noted that there was neither a statutory provision nor case law supporting
forfeiture.34 Hence, the court stated that such circumstances afforded a
strong presumption against forfeiture, even though the result was to
reward crime.35
Such a result from these "dispassionate oracles ofjustice,' 36 of course,
would disturb the legal community at least as much as the prospect of
courts surprising people by rewarding a murdering heir.37 As one writer
commented, "[t]he most striking, and certainly most gruesome, of the
illustrations of the inflexible nature of title by descent have been the cases
involving inheritance by murderers. 38 Justice Cardozo expressed that
same sentiment when he stressed that "the social interest served by refusing
to permit the criminal to profit by his crime is greater than that served by
the preservation and enforcement of legal rights of ownership. 39
In Elmer's case, the court is not construing a constitution and, there-
fore, must literally apply applicable statutory law. No one has ever suggest-
ed, however, that courts must bury their heads in sand rather than use
common sense to construe statutes. The Owens court presumed that
without specific judicial or legislative authority, the court could not
provide relief.40 But another presumption was ignored-the presumption
against injustice. One presumption used in statutory construction is to
presume that the legislature did not intend to violate a settled priniciple of
natural justice.4 ' Furthermore, in regard to the general principle of avoid-
32. Id. at 482.
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 13047 (1973).
34. Owens v. Owens, 100 N.C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888).
35. Id.
36. See F. CAHILL, JUDICIAL LEGISLATION 3 (1950).
37. See, e.g., Owens v. Owens, 100 N.C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888).
38. Lauritzen, Only God Can Make An Heir, 48 Nw. L. Rav. 568, 580 (1963).
39. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 43 (1921).
40. Owens v. Owens, 100 N.C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888).
41. H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTITUTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 122 (2d ed.
1911).
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ing injustice and absurdity, any statutory construction that enabled a
person to profit by his own wrong should most certainly be rejected.42
Thus, if a statute should not be construed to allow a person to profit from
his wrongdoing, a murderer should not profit from his or her wrongful act.
Another principle of statutory construction ignored by Owens and
similar cases43 is a court's duty to ascertain the meaning and intention of
the legislature." Had the Owens court investigated the legislative intent of
the dower statute, it is probable that they would have found against the
murdering spouse. In fact, as a result of the Owens decision, the North
Carolina legislature amended the dower statute to prevent a wife from
receiving dower when she had feloniously slain her husband.45 Rules of
statutory construction and the reality of judicial legislation provide ample
authority to reach a more just result.
B. Criminal Law-The Only Punishment for the Slayer?
Courts have also relied on the criminal law to grant a slayer his or her
bounty. These courts note that a denial of inheritance to a slayer is an
additional punishment beyond the punishment imposed by criminal law.
46
They argue, therefore, that public policy demands that a slayer be pun-
ished only once.47
This argument, however, is nothing more than a judicial cop-out. It
fails to recognize the co-existing and co-equal public policy favoring
compensation of victims. Although the victim's interest in compensation
was historically supplanted by the state's interest in penalizing the
criminal48 and the judiciary's interest in ensuring a fair trial and suitable
defense,49 more recent attention has been focused on the victim.50
The victim is no longer forgotten; and the victim and his or her family
should be compensated. Many jurisdictions, including foreign countries5'
42. G. ENDLICK, A COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 355 (1888). The example
given by Endlick regarded a statute that authorized justices to discharge an apprentice under certain
circumstances when the master appears before them. Id. This statute was construed to also allow the
discharge of an apprentice if the master willfully refused to appear. Id. The reason given by the court for
this construction was to prohibit the master from taking advantage of his own obstinacy. Id. at 355-56.
Here the court stated that "[ilt would be very hard that, supposing the master . . . ran away, the
apprentice should never be discharged." Id. at 356.
43. See note 3 supra.
44. See G. ENDLICK, A COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 328 (1888).
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4099 (1939).
46. For example, in Welsh v. James,408 Ill. 18, 95 N.E.2d 872 (1950), the court stated that"[o]ur
Criminal Code makes unjustifiable homicide punishable by death, or by imprisonment in the peniten-
tiary. These provisions are declarations of the public policy of the State. Such declarations of public
policy are final and binding on the judicial department of government." Id. at 25, 95 N.E.2d at 875.
47. Id. at 24, 95 N.E.2d at 875.
48. CONSIDERING THE VICTIM ix, x (J. Hudson and B. Galaway ed. 1975).
49. Id. at 437.
50. See Wright, What About the Victims, reprinted in CONSIDERING THE VICIM 392-94 (J.
Hudson and B. Galaway ed. 1975); Lamborn, Toward a Victim Orientation in Criminal Theory, 22
RUTGERS L. Rv. 735 (1968).
51. See, e.g., CMND. No. 2323 at 3-5 (Great Britain); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of
1963, Stat. N.Z. 134 (1963) (New Zealand); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1967, N.S.W., Act
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and almost one-half of the states,52 have victim compensation plans. In
addition, both the House of Representatives and Senate are currently
considering proposals for victim compensation. 3 As former Senator
Mansfield stated, "the point has been reached where we must give consid-
eration to the victim of crime-to the one who suffers because of crime.
For him, society has failed miserably .. . [and s]ociety has an obliga-
tion. 54
Therefore, if courts consider public policy for criminal prosecutions,
they cannot ignore the public policy favoring victim compensation. If the
Owens court had considered this co-equal public policy, it would not have
granted the slayer her dower rights. In fact, consideration of this public
policy will also prevent the slayer and his or her descendants from receiving
any part of the victim's property. The courts should not hand over the
spoils of the crime to the criminal.
Refusal to grant the slayer his bounty follows current public policy.
Neither criminal codes nor compensatory statutes support a system that
rewards crime. In addition, the public's concern over the increasing crime
rate5  indicates the public's demand that criminals should not benefit from
their actions. Finally, and most importantly, in jurisdictions in which
statutes do not allow a criminal to benefit from his or her actions, the
statutes are not considered penal. 6 Thus, they are not contrary to the
criminal code, since they have nothing to do with punishing the criminal.
5 7
C. Constitutionality
Another rationale for granting the slayer his or her bounty is that
constitutional provisions prohibit forfeiture. Some courts argue that
preventing the murderer from taking would perpetuate the ancient doc-
trines of attainder and forfeiture,58 and any statute prohibiting the slayer
from taking his victim's property would be unconstitutional.5 9 The majori-
No. 14 (1967) (Australia); The Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1967, Sask. Stat. c. 84 (1967)
(Canadian Province of Saskatchewan); The Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1970, Man. Stat. c.
56 (1970) (Canadian Province of Manitoba).
52. R. MEINORS, VICTIM COMPENSATION xiii (1978). See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§
1500.02, 11211 (West 1966); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 620-635 (McKinney Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE §
26A (Supp. 1971); HAWAII RV. STAT. § 351 (1968); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A (West Supp.
1971); Nay. REV. STAT. § 217 (1969).
53. See, e.g., S. 2155, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965); H.R. 4257, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979).
54. Public Pay for Crime Victims: An Idea That Is Spreading, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REP.,
April 5, 1971, at 40.
55. See generally LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE AD., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC OPINION
ABOUT CRIME (1977).
56. Hamblin v. Marchant, 103 Kan. 508, 175 P. 678 (1918).
57. Id. at 510, 175 P. at 679.
58. G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 478 (rev. 2d ed. 1978) Thus, courts have
reasoned that "[a]lthough a theory of cutting a murderer out of any benefits resulting from his crime
appeals to the court's sense ofjustice, it cannot be overlooked that the Legislature has the power to
declare a rule of descents." Hagan v. Cone, 21 Ga. App. 416,417,94 S.E. 602,603 (1917). The Hagan
court then further discussed the constitutional prohibition against forfeiture. Id. at 416-20, 94 S.E. at
602-03. See also Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180,106 N.E. 785 (1914); McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533,
84 P. 112 (1906).
59. See Hamblin v. Marchant, 103 Kan. 508, 175 P. 678 (1918).
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ty view, however, holds that this result does not work a forfeiture because
nothing was taken from the person convicted. Instead, courts have stated
that the legislature has entire control over the devolution of property; the
prohibition of slayers taking their victims' property is merely a statutory
61
exception.
These courts analyze the nature of the slayer's right to the property
and state there can be no forfeiture unless there is an interference with a
vested right;62 that the right to inherit is an expectant and not a vested
right.63 For example, in Perry v. Strawbridge,a4 the court held that prohib-
iting a murderer from inheriting was not a forfeiture because the statute
simply prohibited him from acquiring property in an unlawful manner.
The court also noted that because the statute did not prohibit the murder-
65
er's heirs from taking his property, no constitutional rights were violated.
In Box v. Lanier," the court held that because the murderer had never
acquired an estate in the victim's property, there was nothing upon which
the constitutional provisions could operate. Therefore, denying a slayer an
inheritance or other benefit from a wrongdoing is constitutional.
II. THE COMMON LAW APPROACH: A SLAYER'S RIGHTS TO
His OR HER BOUNTY UNDER PROPERTY LAW
Although denial of an expected right is not a forfeiture, interests such
as tenancy by entirety and j oint tenancy pose problems because these rights
and all their incidents may be expectant or vested. Had Elmer murdered
someone with whom he shared these rights, he probably would claim that
the rights vested before the murder. Accordingly, to deprive him of the
right of survivorship, which belongs to a joint tenant,67 may work a
forfeiture. Nevertheless, when faced with these property interests and with
insurance policies naming a slayer a beneficiary, courts have attempted to
resolve the issues.
A. Joint Tenancy
The essence of a joint tenancy is the existence of a single estate in
which two or more persons share property equally and have the right of
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908); Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393,79
S.W. 1042 (1904).
63. See generally Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908); Box v. Lanier, 112
Tenn. 409, 79 S.W. 1042 (1904).
64. 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908).
65. Id. Here, the court is referring to the prohibited practice of"attainder," which prohibits heirs
of a criminal from taking by descent and distribution.
66. 112 Tenn. 409, 79 S.W. 1042 (1904). Not all courts have agreed with the Box decision. In
Eversolev. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S.W. 487 (1916), the court refused to apply Box. Stating that"the
property rights of a widow in the estate of her deceased husband are controlled entirely by statute," the
court held that statutory rights cannot be defeated by a common law principle such as the one
forbidding a person from taking advantage of his own wrong. Id. at 794, 185 S.W. at 488.
67. J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 99 (2d ed. 1975).
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survivorship when one of the tenants dies. 68 Traditionally, the right of
survivorship has not been considered to be a type of future interest,
because a fictitious entity enjoys the estate during the joint tenants' lives. 69
Thus, the right of survivorship dictates that when ajoint tenant dies, his or
her individual right to the enjoyment of the property ceases and his heirs or
devisees take nothing because all his interest in the estate has ceased to
exist; the estate continues in the surviving joint tenant.70
The notion that joint tenants enjoy vested rights has made courts
hesitant to deprive a slayer of his or her right of survivorship in cases in
which one joint tenant slays the other.71 As one court reasoned, a charac-
teristic of joint tenancy is the right of survivorship and, under the laws of
real property, a joint tenant does not acquire anything new upon another
tenant's death.72 Rather, the estate of a surviving joint tenant is merely
freed from participation of the other tenant.73
Another basis for allowing the murdering joint tenant his right of
survivorship is statutory. For example, in United Trust Co. v. Pyke,74 the
court noted that the property act of its jurisdiction did not restrict the right
of the surviving joint tenant because of criminal conduct. 75 In Oleff v.
Hodapp,76 in which the property held in joint tenancy was a building and
loan association account, the court held that thejoint tenancy interests had
been created by an inter vivos contract subject only to the general code of
its jurisdiction. Upholding the joint tenant's right of survivorship, the
court stated that there was no statutory law in the jurisdiction that de-
prived joint tenants of their rights.77
Commenting on this rigid interpretation of the law, the court in Grose
v. Holland noted that courts "have not always been deterred by [this]
medieval logic" but "have appreciated that the survivor does acquire
substantial benefit by the death of his co-tenant., 78 Holding that the heirs
of the deceased tenant received a half interest in the property, the Grose
68. II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (Casner ed. 1952).
69. Id.
70. Id. Note that cases of a murdering tenant in common do not pose special problems because
there is no right of survivorship. Id. at § 6.5. There exists a separate share held by each tenant and such
share is an estate of inheritance. Id. Thus, the rights of descent and distribution apply. Such rights are
not vested but are expectant rights, and no forfeiture is worked by depriving a slayer of mere
expectancies. See Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908); Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn.
409, 79 S.W. 1042 (1904).
71. For a list of cases allowing a murdering joint tenant the right of survivorship, see I. BAXTER,
MARTIAL PROPERTY § 5:11 (1973).
72. In re Foster's Estate, 182 Kan. 315, 320 P.2d 855 (1958).
73. Id. at 320, 320 P.2d at 859. The court noted that the distinctive characteristic ofjoint tenancy
is survivorship, and a survivingjoint tenant of real property does not take under the laws of descent and
distribution, but under the conveyance by which the joint tenancy was created, his estate being freed
from participation of the other. Id. at 320, 320 P.2d at 859.
74. 199 Kan. 1, 427 P.2d 67 (1967).
75. Id. at 12, 427 P.2d at 76. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-501 (1976).
76. 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935).
77. Id. at 437-38, 195 N.E. at 838-41.
78. 357 Mo. 874, 878, 211 S.W.2d 464, 466 (1948).
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court stressed that joint tenants must share in the enjoyment of the estate;
after a tenant dies, however, the survivor does not have to share the profits
of the estate with another tenant.79 In addition, a surviving tenant no
longer has to endure the impending loss of interest in the estate should he
or she not survive the other tenant. 80
The reasoning in Grose v. Holland takes a more realistic view of the
property rights of a joint tenant. The total ownership of an estate held by
joint tenants is not completely vested upon creation of that estate; the
vested right a joint tenant enjoys is the merepossibility of total ownership
if he or she survives the other. If, in fact, the murdering joint tenant gains
some new rights upon the death of the otherjoint tenant, these new rights
were not vested before the murder. Furthermore, if these new rights were
not vested before the murder, refusing to grant them to the surviving
tenant after the murder would not work a forfeiture; a forfeiture can only
take place when there is a deprivation of a vested right."1 Thus, depriving
the murdering heir of the right of survivorship cannot be said to work a
forfeiture.
Such an analysis was used in In re King's Estate, z in which the court
held that when a husband murdered his wife and then committed suicide,
property owned by both as joint tenants should not be taken by the
husband's estate. The court asserted that its finding did not work a
forfeiture or attainder, since the estate never vested in the husband.83
King's Estate emphasized that the court was not taking away from the
slayer an estate that he had already acquired; rather, the court was preven-
ting the slayer from acquiring additional property in an unauthorized
manner.84 The court further explained that the murdering joint tenant
retains that which he had before the murder-the right to enjoy the
property equally with the other joint tenant during their lifetime.85 The
murderer suffers only the deprivation of additional property.
86
In re King's Estate also based its decision to not allow a murdering
joint tenant the right of survivorship on the ability to sever the joint
tenancy.87 For example, the court noted that a simple conveyance of a
mortgage, lease, or sales contract by one of the joint tenants will destroy
the tenancy,88 extinguishing the right of survivorship and creating a
tenancy in common.89 If any of these legal acts done by a singlejoint tenant
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908).
82. 261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W.2d 885 (1952).
83. Id. at 272, 52 N.W.2d at 888.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 272-73, 52 N.W.2d at 888.
87. Id. at 273, 52 N.W.2d at 889.
88. Id. See J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 101 (2nd ed. 1975); II AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.2 (Casner ed. 1952).
89. In re King's Estate, 261 Wis. 266, 273, 52 N.W.2d 885, 889 (1952).
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can sever joint tenancy and extinguish survivorship, the illegal act of
murdering the other joint tenant, an act against public policy, should
accomplish the same results.
The rationale for severing joint tenancy when one tenant alienates his
or her interest is that the interests of the tenants to enjoy the property
jointly change.90 Obviously, when one joint tenant murders another, the
victim's interest is no longer the same as that of the murderer's. If this logic
is followed to its conclusion, the joint tenancy becomes tenancy in com-
mon with no survivorship; each tenant becomes a tenant in common
owning an equal and inheritable share. 91 Thus, the murdering tenant
shares equally with the victim's estate; the slayer gets some but not all of
the bounty.
Finally, some courts believe that the joint tenant-slayer acquires
something less than all rights to property held jointly. For example, in In
re Cox's Estate,92 the killer, while not acquiring any interest in his wife's
share of jointly held property, was allowed to retain his half share. In
Abby v. Lord,93 the court was more hesitant about automatically granting
a murdering joint tenant his share of the property. The court sustained a
decision that converted stock held in joint tenancy to tenancy in common,
finding that joint tenancy was destroyed and terminated by the act of
killing the decedent. 94 Instead of following principles of property that
would direct that each tenant in common share equally in the stock,95 the
court held that the murderer was entitled only to the amount that he
contributed toward the joint tenancy property. 96 Another approach allow-
ing the killer to acquire something less than the whole was taken in Neiman
v. Hurff,97 in which the victim and murderer held stock injoint ownership.
The court held that the murderer must hold the property in trust" subject
to a lien in favor of the murderer.99 This lien would be the value of the net
income on the property for the number of years of the murderer's life as
determined by mortality tables.100
Such judicial precedent offers a variety of exotic solutions to the
problems presented by a slayer-joint tenant. The tenant may be awarded
total survivorship rights by courts unwilling to deviate from either tradi-
tional property concepts or statutory provisions regarding the devolution
of property. Yet, to reward the slayer with total ownership of property that
90. Id.
91. Id. See note 70 supra.
92. 141 Mont. 583, 380 P.2d 584 (1963).
93. 168 Cal. App. 2d 499, 336 P.2d 226 (1959).
94. Id. at 508-09, 336 P.2d at 233.
95. See II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.5 (Casner ed. 1952).
96. See Abbey v. Lord, 168 Cal. App. 2d 499, 336 P.2d 226 (1959).
97. 11 N.J. 55, 93 A.2d 345 (1952).
98. For a discussion of the remedy of murderer holding property in constructive trust, see section
entitled Constructive Trust infra.
99. Neiman v. Hurff, 11 N.J. 55, 62-63, 93 A.2d 345, 348 (1952).
100. Id.
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he and his victim held jointly is abhorrent to the basic laws of justice and
public policy.'0 1 Decisions that consider justice and public policy in con-
junction with property law have reached more reasonable results. The
slayer keeps some of the rights of a joint tenant but is not rewarded total
ownership by right of survivorship. In these instances, the measure of the
right kept by the slayer varies. A slayer may be allowed to retain his half
share 12 or to keep the amount that he contributed toward the tenancy.1
3
Considering the variety of solutions offered by case law, if Elmer's
victim had been his joint tenant, his expected results would depend on the
jurisdiction and date of his trial. Following case precedent, the only thing
that our friend Elmer could be certain of is that the decision would be a
surprise. And, again, the question arises-what business do courts have in
surprising anyone? The answer seems to be that they do it all the time.
B. Tenancy by the Entirety
Other problems arise when a tenant by the entirety murders a coten-
ant. If Elmer were to murder his spouse, how would property held as
tenancy by the entirety be effected? Could Elmer succeed in claiming that
any deprivation of his right as tenant works a forfeiture? And, finally, can
Elmer argue that his act of murder cannot destroy the estate because a
tenancy by the entirety cannot be destroyed by the act of one party?
The tenancy by the entirety is a form of co-ownership limited to
husband and wife.10 4 Because the estate is based on the unity of husband
and wife, there is survivorship between tenants by the entirety and neither
one can sever the tenancy or destroy the survivorship.' 05 Consequently, the
surviving tenant takes nothing new from the deceased, having had owner-
ship of the whole from the beginning. 0 6 In many jurisdictions, however,
the tenancy has no modern significance; instead, a conveyance to husband
and wife will give rise to either a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common.'0 7
This result has been reached for a variety of reasons, such as the Married
Women's Property Acts, which were held to have destroyed the spousal
101. "The killer can assert no right to complete ownership as survivor. Equity Will not allow him
to profit by his own crime." Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 880, 211 S.W.2d 464, 467 (1948).
102. In re Cox's Estate, 141 Mont. 583, 380 P.2d 584 (1963).
103. Abbey v. Lord, 168 Cal. App. 2d 499, 336 P.2d 226 (1959).
104. J. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXTr ON PROPERTY 283 (2nd ed. 1969). The estate comes
into being when property is transferred to both husband and wife. The right to hold property by the
entirety grew out of the concept that a husband and wife are considered by law to be one entity. Id.
Under this rationale, when property is conveyed to both, both receive and hold the entire estate jointly.
See J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 95 (2d ed. 1975). As a consequence, an estate held
by the entireties cannot be partitioned except by the voluntary act of both parties orbydivorce; the act
of one party cannot defeat the estate. Id. at 93.
105. J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 95 (2d ed. 1975). The deprivation of the
right of survivorship in regard to joint tenancy is discussed in an earlier section of this article.
106. See G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 478 (rev. 2d ed. 1978).
107. See J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 96 (2d ed. 1975).
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unity.10 8 Today, tenancies by the entireties do not exist in half thejurisdic-
tions of the United States. t°9 Accordingly, in these jurisdictions no concept
of vested property rights would interfere with a denial of a murdering
spouse's right to take his or her bounty.
Some jurisdictions, however, still recognize tenancy by the entirety
and feel compelled to uphold the survivorship rights of tenants holding by
the entirety. In Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, l O in which husband and
wife owned real property by the entirety and the husband murdered his
wife, the court refused to allow the claim of the wife's estate to the
property. The court reasoned that property rights belonged exclusively to
the husband, since title vested in him when the property was conveyed.'
The court in Hammer v. Kinnon 2 agreed and emphasized that when a
man holding an estate by the entirety kills his wife he does not inherit from
her; rather, the estate merely continues in the survivor the same as it would
continue in a corporation after the death of one of its incorporators.
Other jurisdictions, by disregarding the strict property law concepts
of tenancy by the entireties, have refused to grant the slayer any bounty.
For example, in Van Alstyne v. Tuffy," 13 the husband murdered his wife
and then committed suicide; the court granted a judgment in favor of the
wife's heirs, adjudging them to be the owners of property held by husband
and wife as tenants by the entirety. The court reasoned that claims of
property ownership were subject to the same equitable principle as that
which prohibits a person from profiting by his own wrong 1 4 Following
this line of reasoning, the court in In re Estates of Pinnock1 5 also
disallowed the husband's taking when it questioned whether the wrongful
act of the slayer had altered his property rights as a tenant by the entire-
ty.t1 6 The court reasoned that while both husband and wife were alive, each
had no more than a life interest in an undivided one-half of the property
with a possibility of entire ownership if one survived the other.' '7 Thus, the
court refused to convert the husband's rights to those held by a tenant in
common because it "would elevate the nature of his ownership as a result
of his wrongful conduct."" 8 In addition, the court held that the murderer
108. Id. Other factors have influenced the elimination of this type of concurrent ownership. The
demands of creditors for increased access to the assets of their debtors and the movement for
simplification of the law have questioned the justification of the existence of this separate category of
ownership. 4A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 621 (Rohan ed. 1979).
109. Id.
110. 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907).
Ili. Id. at 45, 100 S.W. at 109-10.
112. 16 Pa. D. & C. 395 (1931).
113. 103 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y.S. 173 (1918).
114. Id. at 457, 169 N.Y.S. at 173-74.
115. 83 Misc. 2d 233, 371 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1975).
116. Id. at 237, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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forfeited his rights of survivorship when he became a survivor solely
because he killed his wife. 19
Other jurisdictions have been more generous to a slayer. In Ashwood
v. Patterson,120 a husband murdered his wife, and the court held that the
murder acted to sever the estate by the entirety. The estate was treated as if
it were held by tenancy in common and it descended one half to the heirs of
the wife and one half to those of the husband. This treatment of the
property as if held by tenancy in common has been followed by many
courts in granting the slayer (or his heirs) a one-half interest.121
The concept of severance of an estate by the entireties when one tenant
murders the other has been relied on by some jurisdictions to refuse the
slayer any additional bounty. In Cowan v. Pleasant,122 a husband was not
allowed to assert a right of survivorship when he murdered his wife and
then committed suicide. The court reasoned that the husband's heirs were
entitled to one-half of the property in the same manner as if the marital
relationship had been severed. 123 Severing the tenancy under these circum-
stances, courts have held that the event of murder prevents the slayer's
estate from inheriting the total ownership of property held in tenancy by
the entireties.124 Following this line of reasoning, other courts have analo-
gized the murder situations to divorce cases, holding that since the fiction
119. Id. In Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874,211 S.W.2d 464 (1948), the court pointed out that the
law regarding survivorship applied only to instances where one tenant dies of natural causes and not
where the death of one tenant is caused by the other. Id. at 880, 211 S.W.2d at 466. Also, it was noted
that if the slayer were to acquire the whole interest as survivor, his contingent interest would be
converted into a certainty. Such a result would award the slayer for his wrong, an outcome which is
abhorrent to the law. Id.
120. 49 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1951).
121. See National City Bank v. Bledsoe, 237 Ind. 130, 144 N.E.2d 710 (1957); Cowan v. Pleasant,
263 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1953); Budwit v. Herr, 339 Mich. 265, 63 N.W.2d 841 (1954). The idea that the
court is not bound by the legal fiction of spouses' vested ownership in the entire estate is not new. In
Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757 (1930), the husband murdered his wife and then
committed suicide; the court held that only one-half descended to the husband's heirs and refused to
acknowledge that the murdering husband had a right of survivorship in the entire estate. Id. at 920-23,
27 S.W.2d at 760-62. The court stated that ownership of the whole by both tenants by the entireties was
a fiction and that the rights of survivorship were not automatic; before the benefits of survivorship
could be enjoyed, there must be a determination of death in the ordinary course of events. Id. at 920,27
S.W.2d at 761. Furthermore, the court stated that, in fact, tenants by the entireties have separate
interests in the property. Id. at 918, 27 S.W.2d at 759. To support this notion of separate interests, the
court pointed out other instances where it was found that a tenant by the entirety had a separate interest
in property, apart from the other spouse's interest. Id. at 918, 27 S.W.2d at 759. For example, in
Holmes v. Kansas City, 209 Mo. 513, 108 S.W. 9 (1907), an estate by the entirety was the subject of
condemnation proceedings and the wife co-tenant was not made party to the suit. In an action for
damages, the court held that she had a substantial and recognizable interest apart from her husband's
interest. Id. at 526, 108 S.W. at 13.
Instead of simply granting a one-half interest in property held by the entirety, some courts have
been more creative in the type of bounty granted to the slayer. In In re Hawkin's Estate, 213 N.Y.S.2d
188 (1961), a wife killed her husband and was held entitled to the committed value of the net income of
half of the property for her life expectancy.
122. 263 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1953).
123. Id. at 496.
124. See Van Alystne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y.S. 173 (1918).
MURDERING HEIRS
of unity of estate is destroyed by divorce, it should also be destroyed when
one spouse murders another.1
25
Thus, a "foul and felonious deed" that severs the marital status also
removes the only foundation on which to base the right of tenants by the
entirety. 126 In these instances, the property concepts of complete and
vested rights by tenants are not invincible and can be set aside. Destruction
of the right of survivorship can arise by destroying the basis of tenancy by
entirety-marriage. Accordingly, as murder destroys the marital status,
the destruction of the status destroys the rights of survivorship.
C. Insurance Policies
When a beneficiary of an insurance policy has murdered the insured, a
court must face issues that do not arise for other property rights. First, a
court must determine whether the beneficiary has a vested interest in the
policy payments. If so, denying the beneficiary the insurance benefits may
be an unconstitutional forfeiture or additional penalty.
Some early courts were not troubled by the possibility of forfeiture
claims by a slayer who was denied his or her bounty. In Supreme Lodge
Knights & Ladies of Honor v. Menkhausen,127 a beneficiary of a life
insurance policy murdered the insured. Because of the murder, the court
ruled that the designated beneficiary was outside the list of eligible benefi-
ciaries and granted the proceeds of the policy to the insured's heirs.1
21
Other courts explained their denial of proceeds to the murdering benefi-
ciary by pointing to "the unbroken voice of authority [which holds] that a
beneficiary in an insurance policy who murders the insured forfeits his
rights thereunder."'
129
Other courts refused the murdering beneficiary his or her bounty on
the basis of public policy. In Sharpless v. Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W.,3 ° the
court held that public policy may not permit the murderer to profit by a
recovery on the policy.' 3 Also, courts have used common logic to support
125. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1951); State v. Ellison, 290 Mo. 28, 233 S.W.
1065 (1921).
126. See Hogan v. Martin, 52 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1951). Another example of destruction of tenancy
by the entirety is when one tenant renewed a leasehold in her name alone. Rezabek v. Rezabek, 196 Mo.
App. 673, 192 S.W. 107 (1917).
127. 209 111. 277, 70 N.E. 567 (1904). For a list of cases supporting the general proposition that a
beneficiary of a life insurance policy who kills the insured is precluded from recovering the proceeds see
Annot., 27 A.L.R. 3d 794, 802-04 (1969).
128. Supreme Lodge Knights & Ladies of Honor v. Menkhausen, 209 Ill. 277,282-83,70 N.E.
567, 569 (1904).
129. Schmidt v. Northern Life Ass'n, 112 Iowa 41, 44, 83 N.W. 800, 801 (1901). See, e.g., New
York Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886); Schrienerv. High Court, 35 Il. App. 576
(1889).
130. 135 Minn. 35, 159 N.W. 1086 (1916).
131. Id. at 36, 159 N.W. at 1087.
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the denial of the murdering beneficiary his taking. 3 2 For example, courts
have reasoned that since a person who burns his own house cannot recover
under an insurance policy, neither can a beneficiary who murders the
insured. 133
Such reasoning, however, was soon met with claims by the murderer
that denial of insurance proceeds did, in fact, work a forfeiture. In John-
ston v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 34 the insured was murdered by
his wife, the beneficiary of his insurance policy, who later assigned her
rights to the proceeds to another person. In a suit brought by the murder-
ing wife, the court noted that "[u]nder our law there is no longer corruption
of blood or forfeiture of estates upon conviction of crime."1 35 Therefore,
the court did not allow the beneficiary to recover in her own right; but she
was granted the right of recovery as a taker of the insured's estate under the
laws of descent and distribution.1
36
In Illinois Bankers' Life Association v. Collins,'37 the court addressed
this question and noted that since the insured had the right to change the
beneficiary during her life, the beneficiary had no vested interest in the
policy. 38 Instead, when a husband-beneficiary kills his wife, the situation
is treated as if the husband had been divorced from his wife and she had
thereafter died; under these circumstances, the property would pass to the
next of kin of the deceased rather than to the murderer.1
39
Thus, when the insured retains the right to change beneficiaries, any
vested rights in the insurance policy remain with the insured. These vested
rights have been deemed to be "choses in action" and are the property of
the insured, not the beneficiary.14 0 Accordingly, no forfeiture takes place
upon the denial of the beneficiary's right to take the proceeds from a policy
when the beneficiary has killed the insured.'
41
Even when a beneficiary has some rights or claims to an insurance
policy, courts have denied the slayer his bounty. For example, in Draper v.
132. W VANCE, INSURANCE § 108 at 679 (3d ed. 1951). For example, in the case of an anticipatory
breach of contract by an insurer the cause of action has been held to be in the insured and not in the
beneficiary. Id. Such a situation was presented in Speer v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 N.Y. Sup. Ct.
322 (1885), in which the company was willing to pay the insured the cost of replacing a broken contract.
See Lovell v. Insurance Co., 111 U.S. 264 (1884).
133. New York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886); Illinois Banker's Life
Ass'n v. Collins, 341 II1. 548, 552, 173 N.E. 465,467 (1930). See Eagle Star & British Dominos Ins. Co.
v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927).
134. 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S.E. 865 (1919).
135. Id. at 74, 100 S.E. at 867.
136. Id.
137. 341 Ill. 548, 173 N.E. 465 (1930).
138. Id. at 550, 173 N.E. at 466.
139. Id. at 551, 173 N.E. at 466. See New York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591
(1886); Schmitt v. Northern Life Ass'n, 112 Iowa 41, 83 N.W. 800 (1900); Johnston v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S.E. 865 (1919).
140. See W. VANCE, INSURANCE § 108 at 679 (3d ed. 1951).
141. Greer v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 166, 221 S.W.2d 857 (1949); Johnston v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S.E. 865 (1919); see also 4 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF
INSURANCE LAW § 27:149 at 698-99 (2d ed. 1960).
[Vol. 41:905
19801 MURDERING HEIRS
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 142 the husband was the owner and
beneficiary on policies insuring his wife. After he murdered her and then
killed himself, the court ruled that he and his heirs were estopped from
receiving the proceeds and, therefore, the proceeds were part of the wife's
taxable estate.143 Another example is New York Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Armstrong,144 in which a policy insuring the decedent was payable
to him or his assigns. Before his death, he assigned his rights to receive the
proceeds to a third person, and there was evidence that this assignee
feloniously killed the insured. 145 While deciding the case on evidentiary
grounds, the court commented that "[i]t would be a reproach to the
jurisprudence of the country, if one could recover insurance money pay-
able on the death of a party whose life he had feloniously taken.', 46 Thus,
regardless of the rights to insurance policy proceeds claimed by a benefi-
ciary, the court denied the slayer his bounty.1
47
Because of this emphasis on equitable principles, the constructive
trust method has been used to deny a murdering beneficiary his or her
bounty.148 For example, in Jackson v. Prudential Insurance Co.,' 49 the
court, noting that settled public policy did not allow one to profit from his
own wrongdoing, imposed a constructive trust on the money. 50 Under this
trust, the slayer of the intestate victim was ordered to hold the proceeds as
constructive trustee for the other heirs. 15' Although the wrongdoer had
legal title to the property and the laws of descent and distribution were
142. 536 F.2d 944 (Ist Cir. 1976).
143. Id. at 949.
144. 117 U.S. 591 (1886). For other cases holding that an assignee of such policies who murders
the insured is precluded from recovering proceeds, see Holdom v. Ancient Order, O.A.U.W., 159 Ill.
619, 43 N.E. 772 (1895); Houser v. Havin, 32 Tenn. App. 670, 225 S.W.2d 559 (1949).
145. New York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 597 (1886).
146. Id. at 600. When a beneficiary causes the insured's death unintentionally and not felonious-
ly, such beneficiary can recover the proceeds. See also Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 263 F.2d 931 (6th Cir.
1959).
147. For examples of authorities which hold that it would be against sound public policy to
permit a beneficiary of a life insurance policy to recover proceeds on that policy when he has killed the
insured, see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shane, 98 Ark. 132,135 S.W. 836 (191 1); Schmidtv. Life Ins.
Ass'n, 112 Iowa 41, 83 N.W. 800 (1900); Anderson v. Life Ins. Co., 152 N.C. 1, 67 S.E. 53 (1910);
Filmore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 82 Ohio St. 208, 92 N.E. 26 (1910).
A question could arise, however, whether this may involve a forfeiture of valuable rights under the
policy for commission of a crime. The beneficiary will not be entitled to recover the face amount of the
policy. The injustice of any other result would be apparent if, for example, the face amount was $10,000
whereas he had paid $500 in premiums. Nor will he be able to obtain restitution of the premiums paid,
since the insurer was carrying the risk. But, it would not be proper to hold that he forfeited the cash
surrender value because of the homicide. 4 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 20.14 (1978).
148. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 189 (1937). Section 189
provides that:
(I) If the beneficiary of a life insurance policy murders the insured, he holds his interest
under the policy upon a constructive trust for the estate of the insured.
(2) If the beneficiary of a life insurance policy in which the insured has not reserved
power to change the beneficiary is murdered by the insured, the latter holds his interest under
the policy upon a constructive trust for the estate of beneficiary.
149. Jackson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 106 N.J. Super. 61, 254 A.2d 141 (1969).
150. Id. at 78, 254 A.2d at 150.
151. Id.
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followed, the benefit of ownership was held by those considered by public
policy to be more deserving.
Other courts, strictly adhering to statutory mandates, have allowed a
slayer to collect insurance proceeds. One strange result occurred in Mur-
chison v. Murchison,15 2 in which the beneficiary of a husband's life insur-
ance policy killed her husband, who died intestate and without children. In
this case, the court held that the wife, by her wrongful act, deprived herself
of taking the proceeds as beneficiary; instead, the proceeds were vested in
the husband's estate.1 53 The court then reviewed the statutory law of
descent and distribution and held that the wife took the proceeds as part of
her husband's estate.1 54 Refusing to make an exception to statutory law,
the court noted the plain and unambiguous language of the statute and
asserted that it must be given effect by the courts even though the death was
intentionally caused by one to whom the property would descend and
vest. 155 Thus, although insurance proceeds do not directly pass to a
wrongdoer-beneficiary, the proceeds pass to a victim's estate. If a
wrongdoer-beneficiary is a taker of the estate under the statutory laws of
descent and distribution, some courts have held that they lack power to
interfere with such taking.
1 56
The intent of the insured has also been considered by courts when
deciding whether to allow a beneficiary insurance proceeds. In Beck v.
West Coast Life Insurance Co., 157 Justice Traynor noted that even though
the full intent of the insured cannot be carried out, the insured indicated
that any interest of her estate should be subordinate to those of the
alternate beneficiary. Thus, to hold that the insured's estate and not the
contingent beneficiary is entitled to the proceeds would defeat this
intent.'58 In addition, such a finding would allow the slayer to deprive the
alternative beneficiary of her opportunity to take if the slayer predeceased
the insured. 5 9 Using this same reasoning in Brooks v. Thompson, a
murderer was precluded from taking insurance proceeds, and the contin-
gent beneficiary under the policy, rather than the estate of deceased,
received payment. 160 The murderer was prohibited from taking by statute,
152. 203 S.W. 423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
153. Id. at 426.
154. Id.
155. Id. The court cited many cases for authority that courts cannot interfere with the statutory
rules of descent and distribution even when the result is to allow the murderer his or her bounty.
156. See Owens v. Owens, 100 N.C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888); Shallenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb.
631, 59 N.W. 935 (1894); Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 A. 637 (1895); McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan.
533, 84 P. 112 (1906); Hill v. Noland, 149 S.W. 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). The Texas legislature later
enacted a statute eliminating the interest of a beneficiary in favor of the nearest relative of insured
where the beneficiary willfully brings about the death of insured. See Greer v. Franklin Life Ins. Co.,
148 Tex. 166, 221 S.W.2d 857 (1949).
157. 38 Cal. 2d 643, 241 P.2d 544 (1952).
158. Id. at 647, 241 P.2d at 547.
159. Id. at 648, 241 P.2d at 547.
160. 521 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. 1975).
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and the court reasoned that the statutory prohibition reflected the legisla-
ture's intent that alternative provisions in a will or deed should be carried
out when a person is barred from taking.'
16
A slightly different result was reached in Turner v. Prudential Insur-
ance Co.,1 62 in which the court held that the murderer-primary beneficiary
was to hold the proceeds for the benefit of the contigent beneficiaries
rather than the decedent's estate.163 Focusing on the intent of the insured,
the court noted that the designation of a beneficiary in an insurance policy
is donative and testamentary in nature. 164 It is, therefore, evidence of an
insured's intent that alternative beneficiaries have rights to receive insur-
ance proceeds superior to those of an insured's estate.165 Hence, courts
have been creative in finding legal bases to support the principle that no
one may profit from his or her wrong; and by finding support for this
principle, courts have denied a slayer his or her bounty.
III. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS: A COURT-MADE SOLUTION
The remedy of the constructive trust has often been adopted as a
solution to the variety of problems posed by a slayer and his or her
bounty. 166 The constructive trust is an equitable device used to compel one
who unfairly holds a property interest to convey the interest to whom it
justly belongs. 167 This is done by an equitable decree that vests legal title in
the wrongdoer but directs the wrongdoer-trustee to convey the property to
the beneficial owners. 168 As a result, consistency and logic are both pre-
served because first, legal title to the property passes by will in accordance
161. Id. at 566. The court noted that an opposite result had been reached in Bullock v.
Expressmen's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N.C. 254, 67 S.E.2d 71 (1951), in which the court used "a close
and literal interpretation of the language of the policy." Brooks v. Thompson, 521 S.W.2d 563, 566
(Tenn. 1975). In Bullock, proceeds from the insurance policy were held payable to the estate of the
insured. Bullock v. Expressmen's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N.C. 254,258, 67 S.E.2d 71,75 (1951). This
result was subsequently changed by statute. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 3 1A-11 (1961).
162. 60 N.J. Super. 175, 158 A.2d 441 (1960).
163. Id. at 181-82, 158 A.2d at 444-45.
164. Id. at 178, 158 A.2d at 442-43.
165. Id. at 178-79, 158 A.2d at 443.
166. See generally G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 578 (rev. 2d ed. 1978).
167. Id. at § 471. For example, in Pope v. Garrett, 147 Tex. 18, 211 S.W.2d 559 (1948), the heirs
of testatrix created a disturbance and prevented her from executing a will in favor of a third party. The
court stated:
it is a well settled general rule that if one person obtains the legal title to property . . . by
fraud . . . [or] in any other unconscientious manner, so that he cannot equitably retain the
property . . . equity carries out its theory of a double ownership, equitable and legal, by
impressing a constructive trust upon the property in favor of the one who is in good
conscience entitled to it.
Id. at 21-22, 211 S.W.2d at 560 citing Binford v. Snyder, 144 Tex. 134, 138, 189 S.W.2d 471, 472-73
(1945).
168. See G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471 (rev. 2d ed. 1978). The Restate-
ment of the Law of Restitution asserts that:
(1) Where a devisee or legatee murders the testator, he holds the property devised or
bequeathed to him upon a constructive trust for the persons who would have been entitled to
the property on the death of the testator if the devise or bequest had been revoked.
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with the laws of descent and distribution or under property law, and
second, public policy is served by requiring a murdering heir to distribute
equitably property interests to innocent third parties.169 In effect, a con-
structive trust is a form of passive trust in which a trustee has no real
powers. The only purpose of such a trust is to obtain an equitable result.
1 70
Thus, a beneficial owner of such a trust is entitled to full title to the
property free from any intervention or control by a trustee.
1 7 1
Courts have used the remedy of a constructive trust in several situa-
tions. For example, in a case involving intestate succession, one court
reversed and remanded a decision that awarded a decedent's estate to his
parents instead of his spouse, who had been convicted of killing the
decedent.72 Because there was no statutory exception to the spouse's
statutory share, the court held that legal title should pass to the surviving
spouse but only as a constructive trustee. 173 Therefore, the court avoided
judicial legislation by amending the statutory laws of descent and distribu-
tion, allowing legal title to pass according to the statutes. The court held,
however, that a court of equity could direct the surviving spouse to hold
the property in trust for the decedent's parents.
1 74
Similarly, when faced with a murdering heir who would inherit under
a will, a Texas court applied the doctrine of unjust enrichment. 75 By
creating a constructive trust, the court avoided judicial legislation and
prevented the murdering husband from inheriting his wife's estate. 176 This
(2) Where a person is murdered by his heir or next of kin, and dies intestate, the heir or
next of kin holds the property thus acquired by him upon a constructive trust for the person
or persons who would have been heirs or next of kin if he had predeceased the intestate.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 187 (1937).
Once property has been held to be subject to a constructive trust, the person having beneficial
interest can proceed in equity to compel the constructive trustee to transfer the property to him in
specie. Id. at § 160, comment e. Alternatively, a person having a beneficial interest in such property may
maintain an action at law against the constructive trustee for the value of the property. Id.
169. See, e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506,22 N.E. 188 (1889). See B. CARDOZO, THENATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 42 (1921).
170. See 5 SCOTT ON TRUSTS 462 (3d ed. 1967). Justice Cardozo wrote that "a constructive trust is
the formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression. When property has been acquired
in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial
interest, equity converts him into a trustee." Beatty v. Buggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380,386,
122 N.E. 378, 381 (1919). See Bellows v. Page, 88 N.H. 283, 284, 188 A. 12, 13-14 (1936).
171. G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 207 (rev. 2d ed. 1978). By applying the
Statute of Uses, the beneficial right or use is executed. The Statute of Uses can be applied to both
interests in land and personality. Id.
172. In re Estate of Mahoney, 126 Vt. 31, 220 A.2d 475 (1966).
173. Id. at 36, 220 A.2d at 479.
174. Id. at 33-34, 220 A.2d at 477-78.
175. Pritchett v. Henry, 287 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
176. Id. at 549. In this case, a husband killed his wife, and the court noted that because neither
the statutes on wills nor the statutes on descent and distribution in Texas made any provision regarding
murdering heirs, the wife's property had to pass under the will or by intestacy to the murdering
husband. Id. The court, however, reasoned that application of the law triggered the equitable principle
of unjust enrichment and, therefore, the court created a constructive trust so that the murdering
husband would not profit by his wrong. Id. at 549-51. Finally, the court held that a constructive trust
could be used to reconcile problems of dower and curtesy when one spouse murders the other. Id. at
550.
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reasoning has also been applied in cases ofjoint tenancies 177 and tenancies
by the entirety. 178 The special problem with these tenancies, however, is the
court's determination of which portion of an estate is to be held in a
constructive trust. One court held that the constructive trust was com-
prised of a murdered wife's interest in the net income of the property for
her normal life expectancy. 7 9 A Delaware court, however, disagreed when
it permitted a murdering husband to enjoy the value of the net income of
his wife's one-half interest for his life expectancy.1
80
Even with these minor inconsistencies, however, courts have found
the constructive trust a desirable remedy to murdering heir problems
because the remedy does not violate statutory law. Instead of contravening
or circumventing the various applicable statutes, the constructive trust is
viewed as outside such statutes; it is a creature of equity.18' Furthermore,
under the murdering heir or spouse circumstances, legal title passes ac-
cording to the normal operative rules of wills, succession, concurrent
estates, and contingencies. 8 2 The constructive trust remedy, therefore,
does not violate established rules such as those found in property law.
IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
In many of the foregoing cases, the courts relied on general principles
177. See, e.g., Bradley v. Fox, 7 II. 2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955). In this case, a husband and
wife owned property as joint tenants, and the husband killed his wife. Id. at 108, 129 N.E.2d at 701.
Refusing to be led blindly by strict adherence to the property rules ofjoint tenancy, which would have
allowed the husband to take his wife's one-half interest in the property, the court held that the murderer
retained title only to his undivided half-interest in the property and held the remaining interest as
constructive trustee for the benefit of his wife's heirs. Id. at 118, 129 N.E.2d at 706. Thus, the court
agreed with Cardozo, who wrote that "the social interest served by refusing to permit the criminal to
profit by his crime is greater than that served by the preservation and enforcement of legal rights of
ownership." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 43 (1921).
178. See, e.g., Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927). In this case, the court stated
that when a husband and wife hold property as tenants by the entirety, and the husband murders his
wife, the husband takes legal title. Id. at 378, 137 S.E. at 191. The husband must, however, hold the
wife's one-half interest as a constructive trustee until his death, at which time the deceased wife's heirs
will take legal and equitable title to the property. Id. at 379, 137 S.E. at 191-92.
179. Sherman v. Weber, 113 N.J. Eq. 451, 167 A. 517 (1933). Here, title to property held by
husband and wife as tenants in the entirety was vested in the husband in fee as survivor, subject to a
trust in favor of the wife's heirs.
180. Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch. 122, 80 A.2d 923 (1951). Here, legaltitlevested in the husband
as constructive trustee for the benefit of the victim's heirs. Here is a similar disagreement regarding
property held by joint tenants. See, e.g., Veseyv. Vesey, 237 Minn. 295,54 N.W.2d 385 (1952) (where
the wife killed her husband with wflom she held jointly a bank account, the wife was entitled to the
balance of that account subject to a constructive trust for the benefit of the decedent's heirs); Neiman v.
Hurff, 11 N.J. 55, 93 A.2d 345 (1952) (where a husband murdered his wife with whom he held stocks as
joint tenant, the court held that the husband would take the shares of stock in trust for those taking
under the wife's will. This constructive trust was subject to the husband's award of the value of the net
income of one-half the shares for the number of years of the husband's life expectancy).
181. Pope v. Garrett, 147 Tex. 18, 211 S.W.2d 559 (1948).
182. 4A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 598[4] (rev. ed. 1979). The following present
examples of imposing constructive trusts in situations where various statutes were also applicable. In re
Will of Wilson, 5 Wis. 2d 178, 92 N.W.2d 282 (1958) (where a constructive trust was imposed upon a
legatee who murdered his wife, the court held that he would not share in her estate by operation of the
laws of joint tenancy, intestate succession, or dower); In re Estate of Kalfus v. Kalfus, 81 N.J. Super.
435, 195 A.2d 903 (1963) (where the interest which the husband took by inheritance and as tenant by
curtesy were held subject to a constructive trust).
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to deny a slayer his or her bounty. For example, in Riggs v. Palmer,'83 the
court rejected the earlier decision in Owens v. Owens 84 and relied on the
general principle of law that no one shall be permitted to profit from his or
her wrong. 85 This principle is one of a large body of general principles
that, many scholars believe, are just as much as a part of the law as specific
common law rules and statutes. 186 Yet, neither the court in Riggs v. Palmer
nor scholars who believe in general principles of law have identified the
specific source of these principles.
The whole question of the existence of general principles has been
perpetually examined by scholars of jurisprudence who have debated the
nature of law as either rules or principles and have questioned whether
rules are derived from principles. Hence, a scholar's description of the
nature of the law is the key to whether or not principles are considered part
of the law. For example, John Austin perceives that the law is a set of
commands given by political superiors to political inferiors or orders
backed by threats.187 Thus, the law becomes "a set of timeless rules stocked
in some conceptual warehouse." 188 This characterization does not tolerate
general principles as part of law because principles, by their nature, do not
have a specific source.
H.L.A. Hart argues, however, that the concept of law as commands is
too narrow because it fails to include all of the various types of law, such as
rules conferring legal power, laws that lie behind the operation of law
courts, and statutes conferring legislative powers. 8 9 Thus, Hart character-
izes law as rules originating from a legitimate sovereign body, including
rules that do not fit Austin's description of orders backed by threats. 90
According to Hart, rules are static and there will always be borderline and
unclear cases to which the application of a rule is questionable.' 91 These
borderline cases give the law a certain "open texture" in which the law
refers to classes of persons and things, and a judge must then decide
whether the law is applicable in a specific situation. 192 This conceptualiza-
tion of the law led Justice Cardozo to conclude that the judge's function is
to fill "the open space in the law."'193 Is then, the judge free to make law
183. 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889). The slayer was held not entitled to property either as a
donee under a will or as an heir.
184. 100 N.C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888). A wife convicted as accessory to her husband's murderwas
held entitled to dower.
185. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889).
186. See generally Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967).
187. Austin, The Nature of Law, in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 13 (P.
Shuchman ed. 1979).
188. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14, 16 (1967).
189. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 26-48 (1972).
190. Id. at 49-76. Hart also classified rules as primary (those that grant rights or impose
obligations upon members of the community) and secondary (those that stipulate how and by whom
such primary rules may be formed, recognized, modified or extinguished). Id. at 77-96.
191. Id. at 1-17.
192. Id. at 121-32, 138-50.
193. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921).
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when asked to exercise judicial discretion? Or, is there something else that
the judge must consider in deciding a borderline case?
Ronald Dworkin believes that legal principles are additional authori-
ty that judges must consider. 194 A principle is "a standard that is to be
observed ... because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some
other dimension of morality."'' 95 Illustrating this point, Dworkin discusses
the case of Riggs v. Palmer to support his claim that general principles do
indeed exist and are used by the courts. 96 In Riggs v. Palmer, the court
noted that under the then current law, the murderer should have inherited
the property. The court, however, stated that general, fundamental max-
ims of the common law controlled all laws and that under one such
maxim- that no one shall profit from his or her own wrong-the slayer
must be denied his bounty.'97
Courts not only rely on principles when there is no law or when the
case is "borderline", but also when there is an applicable statutory law,
such as in Riggs v. Palmer, that regulates wills and the devolution of
property.198 Yet, the court refused to apply statutory law, relying, instead,
on "maxims dictated by public policy ... [having] their foundation in
universal law administered in all civilized countries."'1 99 Thus, the court
denied the slayer his bounty.200
Surprisingly, few of the courts that have relied on general principles as
justification for denying the slayer his or her bounty have discussed the
specific origin of these principles.20' In Riggs v. Palmer, the judge ex-
pressed uncertainty concerning the source of the principle and further
suggested that it perhaps had its origin in the civil law system. 20 2 Under
civil law, heirs are classified as "unworthy" if they have been condemned
for having killed or attempted to kill the deceased and are disqualified
from receiving property by will or under the laws of succession.2 3 In some
instances, the children of unworthy heirs are also disqualified from tak-
194. See Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. Rav. 14, 29-30 (1967).
195. Id. at 23.
196. Id. at 23-24.
197. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 509-11, 22 N.E. 188, 189-90 (1889).
198. Id. at 509, 22 N.E. at 189.
199. Id. at 511-12, 22 N.E. at 190.
200. Id. at 511-12, 22 N.E. at 190-91.
201. Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty-History of the Problem in Anglo-American Law, 19 N.Y.U.
L.Q. 229, 268 (1942). For examples of cases relying on general principles, see Cleaver v. Mutual
Reserve Fund Life Association, [1891] 1 Q.B. 147, in which the court stated that it is against public
policy to allow a person to claim any benefit byvirtue of his crime; In re Santourian's Estate, 125 Misc.
668, 669, 212 N.Y.S. 116, 118 (1925), in which the court noted that "[ilt has long been the settled
law .. .that one who kills another for the purpose and with the intent of inheriting or succeeding to
the property of one killed ... could not be permitted to profit by his crime;" Van Alstyne v. Tuffy,
103 Misc. 455,457, 169 N.Y.S. 173, 173-74 (1918), in which the court states that "[ilt is a fundamental
principle of the civil law, as well as the common law, that no person shall be permitted to profit by his
own fraud, or to take advantage . ..by his own crime."
202. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 513, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889).
203. Aios & WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 294 (3d ed. 1967).
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ing.2°4 This unworthiness takes place by operation of law without the
necessity for any judicial declaration.20 5
Several courts have made specific reference to foreign law as the
source of these principles. In In re Wolf, the court reviewed the principle
that no one shall profit from his own crime.20 6 The court noted that under
ancient Roman law inheritance was forfeited when a deceased lost his life
through the fault or negligence of an heir.20 7 The court also pointed out
that the wrongdoer is prohibited from taking under French, German, and
Canadian law. 208 Although the court noted that the common law lacked
such principles, it asserted that common law courts could recognize these
principles as statements of public policy, as was done in Riggs v. Palmer.0 9
Other decisions support the reasoning that these principles are part of
public policy and can therefore be considered as authority upon which to
base judicial decisions. For example, the decision in Fauntleroy's Case is
based "upon the plainest principles of public policy."210 Commenting on
this case, a later court noted that "[i]t may be that there is no authority
directly asserting the existence of the principle; but the decision of the
House of Lords in Fauntleroy's Case appears to proceed on this princi-
ple, 21  on the basis that principles of public policy must be applied. And,
other courts have done just that; they have applied general principles under
the guise of public policy. They have also applied public policy principles
in conjunction with property law,21 2 insurance law, and contract law. 213 In
204. Id. at 292-94.
205. Id. at 294.
206. In re Wolf, 88 Misc. 433, 150 N.Y.S. 738 (1914).
207. Id. at 437, 150 N.Y.S. at 740.
208. Id. Civil law systems, however, are noted for the giving of rules that European judges can
consult in deciding issues. Contrarily, English and American judges, under common law systems, must
examine statutes, stare decisis, and, if there are no precedents or if the question is equitable in nature,
look to underlying principles. Even when relevant statutes and stare decisis exist, judges still revert to
general principles leading some scholars to explore their right to do so within the realm of judicial
discretion. See generally Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the
Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COL. L. Rav. 359, 360-61 (1975).
209. In re Wolf, 88 Misc. 433, 438, 150 N.Y.S. 738, 740 (1914). An interesting suggestion was
raised by Alison Reppy concerning how civil law principles may have found their way into the common
law. See Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty-History of the Problem in Anglo-American Law, 19 N.Y.U.
L.Q. Rev. 229, 268 (1942). Reppy noted that some of the earlier English chancellors were trained in
Rome and were, therefore, "fully acquainted with intricacies of the civil law." Id. Perhaps these
chancellors, who administered the King's justice along with the judges of the common law courts,
assimilated civil law principles into the common law. Id.
210. 4 Bligh (N.S.) 194, 211, 5 Eng. Rep. 70, 76 (Ch. 1830).
211. Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, [1891] 1 Q.B. 147, 156.
212. See previous discussion on joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety. For examples of the
application of principles under the theory of public policy, see Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27
S.W. 757 (1930), which involved property held by the entirety. Here, the court noted that "there are
certain general and fundamental maxims of the common law which control laws as well as contracts.
Among these are: No one shall be permitted . . . to acquire property by his own crime. These maxims
are adopted by public policy and have their foundation in universal law administered in all civilized
countries." Id. at 920, 27 S.W.2d at 760, citing Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621,632, 108 S.W. 641,
643 (1908). In Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill. 2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955), a case involving joint tenancy, the
court pointed out that "t]he Illinois statute prohibiting the devolution of property to a convicted
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addition, equity courts have applied public policy principles in connection
with the principles of constructive trust law.214 Indeed, in public policy
courts have found a sound basis upon which to deny a slayer his bounty.1 5
V. THE COMMON LAW APPROACH: CONCLUSION
The common law has had a good deal of difficulty with murdering
heir problems. When the Forfeiture Act of 1870 completely abolished the
doctrines of forfeiture, corruption of blood, and escheat, some judges felt
bound to strictly follow relevant statutory law. To do otherwise would be
judicial legislation, a repulsive notion to many.
To support the view of strict adherence to statutory law, courts
emphasized that a murdering heir will be punished by the criminal justice
system. Furthermore, they noted that forfeiture has been prohibited by
either a state or federal constitution, and courts are bound to uphold the
constitution. But, forfeiture takes place only when a murderer is deprived
of vested rights; thus, courts have gotten further tangled in the web of law
relevant to the murdering heir problem by having to determine the types of
property rights vested in the murderer. Courts also have been lost in the
legal mire of joint tenancy, tenancy by the entirety, and insurance policy
ownership.
Some courts have found answers to the murdering heir problem by
applying either equitable principles or general principles of law. One
equitable remedy, the constructive trust, has been used to deny the slayer
his or her bounty on the basis of justice or unjust enrichment. The general
principle that no one should profit from his or her own wrong has also been
used as authority for denying the slayer the victim's bounty. Although the
majority of judges, lawyers and scholars agree that the slayer must be
denied his or her bounty, there nevertheless is disagreement concerning the
authority for reaching that conclusion. And, since common law in general
murderer from his victim . . . does evince a legislature policy to deny the convicted murderer the
fruits of his crime." Id. at 116, 129 N.E.2d at 705.
213. See previous discussion on insurance problems. See, e.g., Illinois Banker's Life Ass'n v.
Collins, 341111. 548, 173 N.E. 465 (1930). In this case, involvinginsurance proceeds, the court observed
that "courts may apply the principles of the common law to the requirements of the social, moral and
material conditions of the people . . . and declare what rule of public policy seems best adapted to
promote the peace, good order and the general welfare of the community." Id. at 551, 173 N.E. at 466.
214. See previous discussion on the constructive trust remedy. There is a strong public policy
against allowing a murderer to enjoy the benefits of property formerly owned by a victim. To satisfy
this policy, some courts have not allowed the slayer to take property, but have instead imposed a
constructive trust on the property. See generally Note, Constructive Trust Theory as Applied to
Property Acquired by Crime, 30 HARV. L. REV. 622 (1917).
215. Justice Cardozo explains that principles are interpreted in the "social interest." Discussing
the conflicting principles presented in Riggs v. Palmer, he stated:
There was the principle of the binding force of a will . . . [and] the principle that no man
should profit from his own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong. . . .The murderer
lost the legacy for which the murder was committed because the social interest served by
refusing to permit the criminal to profit by his own crime is greater than that served by the
preservation and enforcement of legal rights of ownership.
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROcEss 41 (1921).
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has traditionally stressed the need to rely on stare decisis and judicial
precedent, courts have been reluctant to rely on general principles. Thus,
there has been a tendency to throw the ball into the legislature's court for a
more comprehensive solution to the problem of the murdering heir.
VI. THE STATUTORY SOLUTION
2 16
As previously mentioned,21 7 the North Carolina Supreme Court, in
Owens v. Owens, allowed a murderess to receive her dower rights even
though she murdered her husband.21 8 Unlike the New York court in Riggs
v. Palmer, which would have not permitted this result,219 the Owens court
chose to interpret strictly the controlling statutes on descent and distribu-
220tion, which statutes contained no special provision for murderers.
In response, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a statute
abrogating this ruling.221 Since then, North Carolina's statutory scheme
216. Following are the statutes this section will address.
ALASKA STAT. § 13.11 (1979) (Alaska); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803 (West 1975) (Arizona); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 61-230 (1971) (Arkansas); CAL. PROB. CODE § 258 (West Supp. 1979) (California); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-11-803 (1974) (Colorado); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-279 (West Supp. 1979) (Connecti-
cut); D. C. CODE ENCYCL. § 19-320 (West 1967) (Dist. of Columbia); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.802 (West
1976) (Florida); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-909 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2506 (1977) (Georgia); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 560:2-803 (1976) (Hawaii); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-803 (Supp. 1977) (Idaho); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110-1/2, §§ 2-6, 4-12 (1977) (Illinois); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-12 (Burns Supp. 1979) (Indiana);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.535 to .537 (West 1964) (Iowa); KAN. STAT. § 59-513 (1976) (Kansas); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (Baldwin 1972) (Kentucky); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 964 to 975 (West 1952)
(Louisiana); MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. art. 27, § 635 (1976) (Maryland); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §
700.251 (West 1980) (Michigan); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-803 (West 1975) (Minnesota); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 91-1-25, 91-5-33 (1972) (Mississippi); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91A-2-803 (Spec. UPC
Pamphlet 1975) (Montana); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2354 (1975) (Nebraska); NEV. REV. STAT. § 134.130
(1973) (Nevada); N. J. REV. STAT. § 3A:2A-83 (1979) (New Jersey); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-2-9,45-2-
803 (1978) (New Mexico); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 3 1A-3 to -14 (1976) (North Carolina); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 30.1-10-03 (1976) (North Dakota); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (Page 1976) (Ohio); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 84, § 231 (Supp. 1979) (Oklahoma); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 112.455 to .555 (Supp. 1977) (Oregon); 20
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8801-8815 (Purdon 1975) (Pennsylvania); R. I. GEN. LAWS §§ 33-1.1-1 to 1-16
(1970) (Rhode Island); S.C. CODE §21-1-50 (1976) (South Carolina); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 29-9-1
to -20 (1977) (South Dakota); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-117 (1977) (Tennessee);TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §
41(d) (Vernon 1956), and TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.23 (Vernon 1963) (Texas); UTAH CODE ANN. §
75-2-804 (1978) (Utah); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 551(6) (1974) (Vermont); VA. CODE § 64.1-18 (1973)
(Virginia); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.84.010 to .900 (1967) (Washington); W. VA. CODE § 42-4-2
(1966) (West Virginia); Wyo. STAT. § 2-3-111 (1977) (Wyoming). See Appendix for analysis of statutes'
contents.
217. See notes 2-7 and accompanying text supra.
218. Owens v. Owens, 100 N.C. 240, 242, 6 S.E. 794, 795 (1888).
219. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 118 (1889). In Riggs, the court refused to follow
Owens and denied a murderer property rights under a will. See notes 2-5 and accompanying text supra.
220. Owens v. Owens, 100 N.C. 240, 242, 6 S.E. 794, 795 (1888).
221. N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 499, amending N.C. Sess. laws ch. 193 § 44,formerly codifiedas N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 30-4 (repealed 1959), states:
Who entitled to dower-Widows shall be endowed as at common law as in this chapter
defined. Provided, if any married woman shall commit adultery, and shall not be living with
her husband at his death, or shall be convicted of the felonious slaying of her husband, or
being accessory before the fact to the felonious slaying of her husband, she shall thereby lose
all right to dower in the lands and tenements of her husband; and any such adultery or
conviction may be pleaded in bar of any action or proceeding for the recovery of dower.
See Walsh, Decedent's Estates-Forfeitures of Property Rights by Slayers, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
448 (1976). See also In re Kuhn, 125 Iowa 449, 101 N.W. 151 (1906).
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regarding murdering heirs has undergone considerable change. From a
single statute, broadly written and dealing only with marital property
rights, North Carolina's law is currently controlled by a multiple statute
with twenty subsections. 2  Unlike the original statute, the latest statute
applies to any person who is convicted, pleads guilty, or pleads nolo
contendere to killing another person.223 Instead of marital property, the
current statute deals with vested and contingent remainders, joint tenan-
cies, tenancies by the entirety, insurance, statutory shares, and vested
remainders or reversions with a life estate in a third person.224
Unlike North Carolina, the statutes in Illinois and Louisiana have
undergone little change. The legislatures have amended the originally
enacted statutes only in minor ways. These two statutory schemes, how-
ever, could not be more different. In Illinois, the two statutes were enacted
in 1939 and address, respectively, descent and distribution 225 and wills. 226
The statutes are broadly phrased and have the same effect-when a person
is convicted of murdering another person, that person's interest in the
decedent's estate is void and the interest passes as if the murderer died
before the decedent. 2 7 Louisiana's statute, however, was originally enact-
ed between 1804 and 1825, amended in 1870, and has fourteen
subsections.2 Like the Illinois statutory scheme, Louisiana's statutes
cover convictions of murderers, but they also apply when a person has
been convicted of attempting to kill another, 229 has subjected a decedent to
a capital punishment for a calumnious remark,230 or has not brought a
murderer to justice.231 Like North Carolina's and Illinois' laws, Louisiana
does not allow a murderer to inherit,232 but, like North Carolina's law,
Louisiana's statute specifies particular circumstances that may arise in
conjunction with a murdering heir.233
In general, the clear trend among the fifty states and the District of
Columbia is toward a statutory scheme that is both broadly stated and yet
addresses the major concerns of a decedent's heirs. The most noteworthy
example of this trend is the promulgation and adoption over the last
222. See the North Carolina statute, cited in note 216 supra.
223. Id. § 31A-3.
224. Id. §§ 31A-5 to -II.
225. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, § 2-6 (1977).
226. Id. § 4-12.
227. Id. §§ 2-6, 4-12.
228. See the Louisiana statute, cited in note 216 supra.
229. Id. art. 966 (1).
230. Id. art. 966 (2).
231. Id. art. 966 (3).
232. Id. art. 964-66. Louisiana refers to a murdering heir as one who is "unworthy," one who "by
failure'in some duty towards a person, have not deserved to inherit from him, and are in consequence
deprived of his succession." Id. art. 964.
233. Id. art. 969-71. These statutes address such situations as restitution, sales, and mortgages
made by an unworthy heir.
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twenty years of section 2-803 of the Uniform Probate Code. 4 Officially
adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the American Bar Association in 1969,235 section 2-803 was the
result of a seven year project by the ABA Section on Property, Probate and
Trust Law.236 The UPC seeks to simplify and clarify probate law, to make
effective a decedent's intent, to promote a speedy and effective system for
liquidating an estate, and to make uniform the laws of the different United
States jurisdictions.237
Section 2-803 appears to be a compromise between the divergent
statutory schemes as illustrated by North Carolina and Illinois-between a
broadly-phrased single statute and a more specific, multiple statute. The
UPC has had a wide effect, with twelve states adopting section 2-803,23B
234. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803. See generally Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code:
Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN. L. REV. 453 (1970). In full, section 2-803 states:
(a) A surviving spouse, heir or devisee who feloniously and intentionally kills the
decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under this Article, and the estate of
decedent passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent. Property appointed by the will
of the decedent to or for the benefit of the killer passes as if the killer had predeceased the
decedent.
(b) Any joint tenant who feloniously and intentionally kills another joint tenant
thereby effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so that the share of the decedent
passes as his property and the killer has no rights by survivorship. This provision applies to
joint tenancies [and tenancies by the entirety] in real and personal property,joint accounts in
banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions and other institutions, and any other form
of co-ownership with survivorship incidents.
(c) A named beneficiary of a bond, life insurance policy, or other contractual arrange-
ment who feloniously and intentionally kills the principal obligee or the person upon whose
life the policy is issued is not entitled to any benefit under the bond, policy or other
contractual arrangement, and it becomes payable as though the killer had predeceased the
decedent.
(d) Any other acquisition of property or interest by the killer shall be treated in
accordance with the principles of this section.
(e) A final judgment of conviction of felonious and intentional killing is conclusive for
purposes of this section. In the absence of a conviction of felonious and intentional killing the
Court may determine by a preponderance of evidence whether the killing was felonious and
intentional for purposes of this section.
(f) This section does not affect the rights of any person who, before rights under this
section have been adjudicated, purchases from the killer for value and without notice
property which the killer would have acquired except for this section, but the killer is liable
for the amount of the proceeds or the value of the property. Any insurance company, bank, or
other obligor making payment according to the terms of its policy or obligation is not liable
by reason of this section unless prior to payment it has received at its home office or principal
address written notice of a claim under this section.
235. NATIONAL CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWs, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1969).
See Zartman, Uniform Probate Code-Policies and Practices, 61 ILL. B. J. 428 (1973); Curry, West
Virginia and the Uniform Probate Code: An Overview, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 111 (1974).
236. See Davis, The New North Dakota Probate Code, 49 N.D. L. REv. 563 (1972). This section
of the American Bar Association also drafted a Model Probate Code in 1946. See L. SIMES & P. BAYSE,
PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW: MODEL PROBATE CODE (1976).
237. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b). See Wellman & Gordon, Uniformity in State Inherit-
ance Laws: How UPC Article I Has Fared in Nine Enactments, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 357, (1976). The
authors strongly argue in favor of the Uniform Probate Code due to the need for national uniformity.
Cf. Semerad, The Uniform Probate Code and New York Law Compared, 48 N.Y. STATE BJ. 96 (1976).
The author states that uniformity for its own sake has no value. Id. at 97.
238. See the Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska,
New Jersey, North Dakota, New Mexico, and Utah statutes, cited note 216 supra.
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California rejecting it, 239 South Dakota adopting and then repealing it , 240
and an additional eleven states either amending existing statutes or enact-
ing new statutes since 1969.241 Currently, besides the twelve UPC states,
eight states lack any statutory provisions on murdering heirs,242 twenty-
one states have a single statute,243 and ten states plus the District of
Columbia have a multiple statutory scheme.24
Legislative activity also has resulted from the refusal of state courts to
read an exception into the general provisions on descent and distribution,
which would allow a murdering heir to inherit. For example, in Kansas the
legislature enacted its statute after a state court refused to disallow an
inheritance.245 Similar histories appeared in other states.4 6 In addition,
amendments to existing statutes on murdering heirs also resulted from
court inaction. For example, in Iowa the supreme court characterized the
then existing statute on murdering heirs as penal and strictly interpreted it,
refusing to extend its operation to spousal shares.4 7 Thereafter, Iowa's
legislature revised the statute to include "any interest in the estate of the
decedent as surviving spouse.
'
,
248
The courts' refusal to read exceptions into the general laws of descent
and distribution or into broadly stated statutes on murdering heirs stems
239. See Guther, The Impending Probate Reform, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 417 (1973); Comment,
Articles IIand IIlof the Uniform Probate Code as Enacted in Utah, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 425,426 n. 10.
The UPC met resistance because it "attempts to simplify many aspects of probate laws by changing
traditional practices." Id. at 426.
240. Wellman & Gordon, Uniformity in State Inheritance Laws: How UPC Article II Has Fared
in Nine Enactments, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 357, 358. The statute was adopted in 1975 and repealed in
1976. Id.
241. Seven states amended existing statutes. See the Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Virginia statutes, cited in note 216 supra. Four states enacted new
legislation. See the Florida, Idaho, Ohio, and Tennessee statutes, cited in note 216 supra. See generally
Bruckin, The Uniform Probate Code and The Practice of Law in Ohio, 7 AKCRON L. REv. 69 (1973);
Wellman & Gordon, Uniformity in State Inheritance Laws: How UPC Article 11 Has Fared in Nine
Enactments, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 357, 358.
242. See the Alabama, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York,
and Wisconsin statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
243. See the Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Virginia, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
244. See the District of Columbia, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
245. See Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49
HARV. L. REv. 715 (1936).
246. Id. at 716. Wade states that "in most of the jurisdictions in which the courts refused to
engraft an exception, a statute rectifying the omission was passed shortly thereafter." Id. He then listed,
as examples, the states of California, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklaho-
ma, Pennsylvania and West Virginia. Id. at 716 n.7.
In Pennsylvania, the legislature enacted its statute after the court in In re Carpenter's Estate, 170
Pa. 203, 32 A. 637 (1895), allowed a son who murdered his father to inherit. Another example is
Washington, in which the legislature responded to the decision in In re Duncan's Estate, 40 Wash. 2d
850,246 P.2d 445 (1952), with 1955 Wash. Laws ch. 141,613, which prohibited a person from inheriting
from an heir whom he or she had murdered.
247. See Kuhn v. Kuhn, 125 Iowa 449, 101 N.W. 151 (1904).
248. 1902 Iowa Acts ch. 135, § 1. See generally Note, 7 IoWA L. BULL. 111, 113 (1922).
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from their reluctance to engage in judicial legislation. Many examples
appear.249 A recent example is Blanks v. Jiggets,250 in which the Virginia
Supreme Court allowed a son who murdered his father to acquire a
remainder interest that had vested under his mother's will. Strictly inter-
preting the applicable statute, the court allowed the son to benefit from the
shortened life estate "because this statute does not prohibit it. '21 Although
calling the son's actions reprehensible,252 the court believed it had no
choice. 3
In other words, the real problem is the division of responsibility
between courts and legislatures. Legislatures can state the rules that courts
can then interpret. The rules would be developed by the legislatures that
have the resources for research and study, the opportunity for public
hearings, and the ability to state public policy rather than interpret the
254law. Legislative action would also give better notice to the public about
the rule of law in that jurisdiction255 and give the public an opportunity to
express its wishes in public hearings.
The courts would then have two roles. First, the courts determine the
constitutionality of the statutes in light of the federal and state constitu-
tions. Second, the courts interpret the rules to find specific solutions based
on the facts and arguments in particular cases.256 The constitutional issues
addressed by courts have involved special legislation, corruption of blood,
forfeiture of estates, and double jeopardy.
First, courts consistently have ruled that these statutes apply uniform-
ly to all members of a class and are therefore general, not special, legisla-
21tion approved by the state's constitution. 5 Legislatures clearly have the
power to control the manner in which property descends and can subject
inheritance to preconditions.258 Second, the statutes do not corrupt the
murdering heir's blood because his or her heirs can inherit; only the
murdering heir cannot take an interest in an illegal manner.259 In addition,
one court examined the purpose of the doctrine of corruption of blood and
stated that it prohibits governmental oppression through the confiscation
249. See, e.g., Shellenbergerv. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N.W. 935 (1894); In re Gwynn's Estate,
239 Pa. 238, 86 A. 789 (1913).
250. 192 Va. 337, 64 S.E.2d 809 (1951).
251. Id. at 342, 64 S.E.2d at 812.
252. Id. at 343, 64 S.E.2d at 812.
253. Id.
254. McGovern, Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. REV. 65, 107 (1969). See
Bolich, Acts Barring Property Rights, 40 N.C. L. REV. 175, 186 (1962).
255. McGovern, Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. REv. 65, 106 (1969).
256. Id. at 108.
257. See, e.g., Wilson v. Bates, 231 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1950).
258. See, e.g., Kocherspergerv. Drake, 167111.122,47N.E.321(1897); McKayv. Lauriston, 204
Cal. 557, 269 P. 519 (1928).
259. See Wade, Acquisition ofProperty by Willfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49
HARV. L. REV. 715,721 (1936). See, e.g., Hamblin v. Murchant, 103 Kan. 508, 175 P. 678 (1918), aff'd
on reh., 104 Kan. 689, 180 P. 811 (1919).
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of property.260 Because the murdering heir statute involves the taking of
property by only private citizens and protects the decedent's property from
being taken illegally, the statute is constitutional. 6'
Third, the statutes do not work a forfeiture of an estate. As the
Tennessee Supreme Court stated, the constitutional prohibition cannot
operate on an estate in property that a murdering husband has never
acquired under statute. 62 As the Missiouri Supreme Court stated, the
statute takes nothing from the murderer; it simply states that an interest
in property cannot be acquired in a certain way.263
Finally, the editorial board of the Uniform Probate Code's section on
murdering heirs addressed the problem of double jeopardy, which arises
because both criminal and civil courts will determine whether a person has
murdered a decedent and the applicable punishment. Different considera-
tions and a different burden of proof, however, are used in determining
guilty or acquittal. Specifically, the editorial board pointed to other legal
questions that also arise in both criminal and civil courts, including
wrongful death cases and tax fraud cases.264
VII. STATUTORY ANALYSIS
The fifty-one American jurisdictions that comprise this study deal
with the problem of murdering heirs in a diverse manner. The jurisdictions
differ on the need for a statute, the type of statutory scheme enacted, and
the content of the statute enacted. Even with these differences, however,
the statutes share many characteristics. Specific provisions appear in many
states; and although the jurisdictions may not enact the same language, the
statutory language may have the same effect. Therefore, the real questions
become first, whether any difference exists among the American jurisdic-
tions and second, whether any specific statutory scheme or language is best
to meet the general goal of not rewarding a murdering heir.
A. Content Generally
The forty-three currently existing statutory schemes that address the
problem of a murdering heir possess one or more of seven elements. These
260. Houser v. Haven, 32 Tenn. App. 670, 225 S.W.2d 559 (1949).
261. Id. at 671, 225 S.W.2d 559.
262. Beddington v. Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907). The court stated that
the statute would not apply to deprive a husband from inheriting property held by the entireties,
because the title vested in him by conveyance and not by a wife's death. Id. at 45, 100 S.W. at 111.
263. Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874,211 S.W.2d 464 (1948). The court disagreed with the result
in Beddington v. Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907), see note 262 supra, and stated
that the statute is constitutional because a husband would acquire property held by the entireties aftera
wife's death.
264. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803, Editorial Board Comment. See also Lugar, Criminal
Law, Double Jeopardy & Res Judicata, 39 IoWA L. REv. 317 (1954); Horack, The Multiple Conse-
quences of a Single CriminalAct, 21 MINN. L. Rav. 805 (1937); Curry, Intestate Succession and Wills:
A Comparative Analysis of Article II of the Uniform Probate Code and the Law of Ohio, 34 OHIO ST.
L. J. 114 (1973).
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elements consist of language mandating the (a) appropriate statutory
construction, (b) interested parties, (c) applicable criminal activity, (d) role
of the probate court and whether a court's decree should be recorded, (e)
form of transfer, and (f) type of property interests effected. 26' As indicated
in chart I, the jurisdictions almost unanimously specify the interested
parties in a statute. The jurisdictions also agree on the need to specify the
applicable criminal activity, the form of transfer, and the type of property
interest involved in a transfer. The jurisdictions disagree, however, on the
need to mandate the judicial construction of their statutory scheme; only
Idaho, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Washington
include such a mandate. 66 Similarly, only Connecticut requires that an
executor or administrator record an adjudication of a murdering heir's
guilt.267 Finally, the states are almost evenly split regarding the need to
state the role of the probate courts.
CHART I. CONTENT OF STATUTES
Content Number of Jurisdictions
Construction of Statute 5
Interested Parties 43
Criminal Activity 42
Role of the Probate Court 37
Recording 1
Form of Transfer 38
Type of Property Interest 39
Within each of these categories, the specific provisions may be either
general, specific, or both general and specific in scope. The differentiation
between general and specific language appears in the categories of interest-
ed parties and the type of property interest specified. As chart II indicates,
most jurisdictions have both general and specific provisions in the same
statutory scheme. This fact appears in both categories-a majority when
specifying the type of property interest to be transferred after a decedent's
death; an equal amount of specific provisions when specifying the interest-
ed parties involved in a transfer of property interests.
B. Statutory Schemes
Although the jurisdictions with statutes freely enact the statutory
scheme they believe best meets the needs of their citizens, several statutory
schemes have been enacted by more than one legislature. The two most
common are section 2-803 of the Uniform Probate Code268 and the Wade
265. See Appendix II infra.
266. See the Idaho, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Washington statutes, cited
in note 216 supra.
267. See the Connecticut statute, cited in note 216 supra.
268. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803. See note 234 supra.
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CHART II. STATUTORY LANGUAGE
Type! Category Number of Jurisdictions
General Provisions Only
Interested Parties 11
Type of Property Interest 10
Specific Provisions Only
Interested Parties 16
Type of Property Interest 2
Both
Interested Parties 16
Type of Property Interest 27
Model.269 Other jurisdictions have added to these two models, and many
others have single statutes that are unique to that individual jurisdiction.
The Uniform Probate Code's section has six parts.27 0 The first three
subsections describe the rules for inheritance under a will or intestate
succession, transfer under a joint tenancy, and benefits acquired under
contract, respectively. The fourth subsection expands the rule enunciated
in the previous subsections and applies it to "[a]ny other acquisition of
property or interest.,27' It is a broad, general provision that covers any and
all contingencies not covered in the previous subsections. Subsection five
delineates the effect of a conviction in a probate court and specifies that
court's role. Finally, the section protects innocent purchasers for value
who had no notice of the decedent's death and other payees who may
unknowingly transfer a decedent's property interest to a murdering heir. In
general, the scheme is both general and specific, seeking to cover specifical-
ly the most common contingencies and to apply generally to all types of
property interests.
Unlike the Uniform Probate Code's section, several jurisdictions have
enacted a more specific and detailed statutory scheme. Seven states-
Idaho, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, and Washington-have enacted a statutory scheme similar to one
appearing in a Harvard Law Review article by Professor John W. Wade.272
Like the UPC section, this scheme also specifically addresses transfer by
will, intestate succession, joint tenancy, and insurance. Unlike UPC sec-
tion 2-803, however, the statute clearly defines the terms "slayer," "dece-
dent," and "property." It also delineates specific rules for many types of
property interests, including joint tenancies consisting of the slayer, dece-
dent, and a third party, tenancies by the entirety, reversions, contingent
269. See Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution,
49 HARV. L. REv. 715, 753-55 (1936). The states of Idaho, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Washington have adopted the Wade Model.
270. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803. See note 234 supra.
271. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803(d).
272. See Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution,
49 HARV. L. REv. 715, 753-55 (1936).
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and vested remainders, and even interests to be divested by powers of
appointment and revocation.273
Opposite these extensive and specifically worded statutes are the
single provision statutory schemes. Constituting almost a majority of
jurisdictions, these states broadly declare the public policy that a murder-
ing heir shall not benefit from his or her wrongdoing. 74 Examplifying this
scheme is California's statute, which simply states that "[n]o person who
has unlawfully and intentionally caused the death of a decedent .. .shall
be entitled to succeed to any portion of the estate., 275 By a broad interpre-
tation of this language, however, California law includes many, if not all,
of the sanctions against murdering heirs as does a Wade or UPCjurisdic-
tion. 76 Thus, the type of statutory scheme enacted may be less important
than exactly what is included within the enactments and how they are
interpreted by the courts of the jurisdiction.
C. Content Specifically.
The chart in Appendix II clearly illustrates the wide divergence
among the jurisdictions concerning the specific legislative enactments. Al-
though some provisions appear in several states and the enactment UPC
section 2-803 has created some uniformity, many differences still remain.
An analysis of each type of provision, therefore, is useful to guide future
legislatures in the enactment of comprehensive yet useful statutes.
1. Statutory Construction
Only five of the fifty-one jurisdictions specifically mention how courts
should construe the statutes. The provisions in Idaho, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Washington are nearly identical. They
state that courts should not consider that the statutes are penal in nature
and that they should be broadly construed to effectuate the public policy
against allowing murdering heirs a benefit from their wrongdoings.
271
2. Interested Parties
State legislatures have identified two general categories of interested
parties-those directly involved in the homicide and innocent third par-
ties. Those directly involved can be identified either generally or specifical-
ly. As chart III indicates, twenty-seven jurisdictions refer simply to "any"
person. The five specific categories of surviving spouse, heir, devisee,joint
tenant, and beneficiary are stated by the UPC and several other jurisdic-
tions. For example, sixteen jurisdictions identify beneficiaries of an insur-
273. See the Idaho, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and
Washington statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
274. See, e.g., the Illinois statute, cited in note 216 supra.
275. See the California statute, cited in note 216 supra.
276. Id.
277. See the Idaho, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Washington statutes, cited
in note 216 supra.
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ance policy or other contractual arrangement. These are the UPC states
plus Kentucky, Iowa, Texas, and Wyoming.278
Besides those that are directly involved in a homicide, many jurisdic-
tions have specifically protected two classes of persons. These are first,
persons who purchase property from a murderer for value and without
notice of the homicide, and second, an insurance company or any other
financial institution or person who, without notice of a claim, makes a
payment to a slayer according to the terms of a policy or other legal
obligation. Fifteen of the jurisdictions that broadly state the person direct-
ly involved in a homicide also protect either one or both of these innocent
third parties. 9
CHART III. INTERESTED PARTIES
Category Number of Jurisdictions
Any 27
Surviving Spouse 13
Husband I
Wife I
Heir 13
Devisee 12
Joint Tenant 13
Beneficiary 16
Bona Fide Purchaser 23
Contractual Obligors 22
Parent Who Kills Child 1
3. Criminal Activity
Unlike the statutory provisions relating to interested parties, the
jurisdictions differ when specifying the criminal activities that trigger a
statute's application. Statutes may include statements describing the na-
ture of a slayer's action, a slayer's intent, and a slayer's participation in a
decedent's death. Twenty-five jurisdictions, including the UPC jurisdic-
tions, limit application of their statutes to felonious or unlawful slay-
ings.2 '0 Therefore, justifiable and excusable homicides will not be affected
by the statutes and a person committing such an act will be able to inherit
property interests from a decedent.28' In fact, three states specifically
278. See the Kentucky, Iowa, Texas, and Wyoming statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
279. See the District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, and Wyom-
ing statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
280. See Alaska, Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylva-
nia, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virgi-
nia, and Wyoming statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
281. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW (1972). The authors list
ignorance, defense of self, public duty, necessity, and other acts as justifications and excuses for a
homicide. Id. at 356-413.
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exclude certain types of slayings-Georgia and Tennessee for accidental
deaths or deaths resulting from self-defense,28 2 South Carolina for invol-
untary manslaughter 283-and Louisiana allows succession to property if a
decedent has knowledge of the injury done to him or her and dies without
disinheriting the slayer, even though there was sufficient time to change
a will.
284
Besides the general type of criminal activity, jurisdictions specify the
slayer's mens rea and actus rea.285 The UPC's section states that the slayer
must intend to slay the decedent.286 Twelve other jurisdictions agree, either
using the term "intent" or "willful" to describe the slayer's mens rea.
287
Other jurisdictions presuppose the existence of the element of intent by
requiring a conviction before the statute applies.288
Although only twenty-four jurisdictions specify that a slayer must
intend or willfully kill or cause a decedent's death,289 all of the jurisdictions
indicate the actus reas. This has been done either generally or specifically.
The UPC states generally that a slayer must have "killed" the decedent.290
Seven of the UPC jurisdictions have adopted this general language,29 1 but
five others have added specific crimes to this provision.292 For example,
Colorado's statute specifies murder in the first and second degrees and
manslaughter, 93 New Mexico specifies "capital felonies" and felonies in
the first and second degree.294 Of the remaining thirty jurisdictions, nine-
teen include only a general reference such as "kill" or "cause",295 ten
specifically identify the possible crimes,296 and Arkansas has both general
and specific statements.297
282. See the Georgia and Tennessee statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
283. See the South Carolina statute, cited in note 216 supra.
284. See the Louisiana statute, cited in note 216 supra.
285. LAFAVE & ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 191-92 (1972).
286. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803(a), adopted in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Utah.
287. See the California, Georgia, Idaho, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and Washington statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
288. See, e.g., the Arkansas, Connecticut, and District of Columbia statutes, cited in note 216
supra.
289. See notes 286-87 supra.
290. See UPC § 2-803(a).
291. See the Alaska, Arizona, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Utah
statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
292. See the Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, Nebraska, and New Mexico statutes, cited in note 216
supra.
293. See the Colorado statute, cited in note 216 supra.
294. See the New Mexico statute, cited in note 216 supra. See also the Hawaii (murder and
voluntary manslaughter), Michigan and Nebraska (aid and abet) statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
295. See the Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oregon, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
296. See the California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Nevada,
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
297. See the Arkansas statute, cited in note 216 supra.
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The specific provisions range from murder in the first and second
degrees, voluntary manslaughter, and a slaying occurring during a felony
to anyone who conspires, attempts, aids and abets, procures, causes a
suicide, or is a principal or accessory before the fact. Those states adopting
the Wade Model refer only to taking or procuring a death 298 or, as in Idaho
and North Carolina, participating as a principal or accessory before the
fact.
299
4. Probate Court
Before a probate court can apply the statutory provisions relating to
murdering heirs, many states require action by the jurisdiction's criminal
justice system. Thirty-four jurisdictions either require a criminal convic-
tion or assert that, as a rule of law, a final judgment of conviction is
conclusive for the applicability of the statute. 300 These thirty-four include
the UPC states, which also, in the absence of a conviction, grant a court the
power to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether a slaying
was felonious and intentional. Other jurisdictions require either a convic-
tion, a plea of guilty, or the entering of a plea of nolo contendere 30  and a
conviction and sentence.302 In California, an acquittal may be proof of the
lawfulness of a killing, 30 3 but, in Louisiana, the statute applies even if the
slayer is pardoned.0 4 Besides these provisions, the statutes require no
other rules for the probate court.
Besides requiring certain procedures, Connecticut states that the
slayer's rights shall be determined by the common law, including equity.0 5
Six states permit the record of a conviction to be admitted in a civil action
against a slayer. 0 6 Louisiana requires that a court specifically declare an
heir to be "unworthy" to inherit 3 7 and limits suits under the statute only to
"relations who are called to the succession in default of the unworthy
heir., 308 And, Connecticut requires that a certified copy of the final
adjudication of guilty to a charge of murdering a decedent be recorded in
the land records of the towns in which real property in a decedent's estate is
situated.30 9
298. See, e.g., the Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Washington statutes, cited in
note 216 supra.
299. See the Idaho and North Carolina statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
300. See Appendix II infra.
301. See, e.g., the Colorado statute, cited in note 216 supra.
302. See, e.g., the Texas statute, cited in note 216 supra.
303. See the California statute, cited in note 216 supra.
304. See the Louisiana statute, cited in note 216 supra.
305. See the Connecticut statute, cited in note 216 supra.
306. See the Idaho, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, and Washington
statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
307. See the Louisiana statute, cited in note 216 supra.
308. Id.
309. See the Connecticut statute, cited in note 216 supra.
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5. Form of Transfer
Almost all of the states specify the type of transfers that the statute affects.
Transfers can be intestate, by will, by deed, or by contract. Contractual
arrangements include insurance policies, bonds, pensions, profit-sharing
plans, annuities, and payments from benevolent organizations. Chart IV
shows the jurisdictions' activities for these categories. The UPC section on
murdering heirs identifies transfer by intestate succession, will, or con-
tract, including life insurance, bond, and any other forms.310 Other juris-
dictions agree and also identify wills and intestate succession, but they
disagree when stating other forms. Instead of identifying life insurance
policies, ten jurisdictions prefer the broader term "insurance." '' North
Carolina identifies annuities,312 and Oregon lists pensions, profit sharing
plans, and payments from benevolent organizations. 313 Finally, Georgia
and Tennessee include transfer by deed.314
CHART IV. TYPE OF TRANSFER
Number of Jurisdictions:
Type Total UPC Other
Intestate 32 12 20
Will 35 12 23
Contract 28 11 17
Insurance 10 10
Life Insurance 17 11 6
Bond 10 10
Other 11 11
Annuity 1 1
Pension 1 1
Profit Sharing 1 1
Benevolent Organization 1 1
Deed 2 2
No matter what type of transfer is identified by statute, the rules for
distributing the property are similar and have the same general effect. In
general, the jurisdictions do not allow the slayer to inherit any of the
property. Provisions of wills are voided, as in Illinois and Mississippi,
315
the property transferred goes into the decedent's estate, as in South
36Carolina,3 6 or, as in the UPC and other states, the murdering heir is
310. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803. See note 234 supra.
311. See the District of Columbia, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wyoming statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
312. See the North Carolina statute, cited in note 216 supra.
313. See the Oregon statute, cited in note 216 supra.
314. See the Georgia and Tennessee statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
315. See the Illinois and Mississippi statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
316. See the South Carolina statute, cited in note 216 supra.
[Vol. 41:905
MURDERING HEIRS
considered to have predeceased the decedent so that other heirs will
succeed to the property.31 7
Other than these general rules, however, special statutes include rules
for distributing insurance benefits or proceeds from other contractual
arrangements. Although the clear majority of jurisdictions do not allow
the murdering beneficiary to take any property interest by providing that
the beneficiary predeceases the insured, other options appear. In Oregon,
for example, the benefits will go to a secondary beneficiary.18 Idaho's
statute agrees, but also allows the benefits to go into a decedent's estate.
31 9
In addition, the benefits go to the decedent's estate in North Carolina,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island if the decedent was the primary
beneficiary. 320 Finally, only Ohio's statute requires the creation of a
constructive trust for the benefits. 2'
6. Type of Property Interest
Like the provisions for interested parties, the provisions specifying the
types of property interests to which a slayer may be entitled are either
general or specific. The jurisdictions that have adopted the UPC's section
have their own provisions, many of which appear in non-UPC jurisdic-
tions. In addition, several states have enacted specific provisions to deal
with special problems that may arise.
Of the thirty-eight jurisdictions having any provision on property
interests, only ten have just a general, broadly stated provision.322 Two
jurisdictions have only specific provisions, 323 and the remaining twenty-six
jurisdictions have enacted both general and specific provisions.24 The
Uniform Probate Code is an example. It contains three provisions-one
relating to joint tenancies, one for property appointed by will, and one
general provision relating to "[a]ny other acquisition of property or
interest by the killer. 3 25 The provision on joint tenancies is made appli-
cable to real and personal property, joint accounts in financial institutions
317. Seethe Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia statutes,
cited in note 216 supra.
318. See the Oregon statute, cited in note 216 supra. Accord Connecticut, Kentucky, Oklahoma,
Texas, Utah, and Wyoming statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
319. See the Idaho statute, cited in note 216 supra.
320. See the North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island statutes, cited in note 216
supra.
321. See the Ohio statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
322. See the Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, Ohio, Texas, Vermont,
and West Virginia statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
323. See the Arkansas and District of Columbia statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
324. See the Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
and Washington statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
325. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803.
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and "any other form of co-ownership with survivorship incidents. 326 In
addition to these provisions, several UPC jurisdictions have made their
statutes applicable to tenancies by the entireties 327 and, in New Mexico, to
community property and any other future interest.328
Those jurisdictions that have adopted the Wade Model329 also include
provisions on property interests in general, insurance, joint tenancies,
tenancies by the entireties, and property subject to powers of appoint-
ment.330 These jurisdictions, however, have enacted other provisions on
property jointly held by three or more persons, reversions, vested and
contingent remainders, executory interests, interests in property to be
divested, and any exercise of a power of appointment. 31 Other miscellane-
ous enactments deal with statutory shares, 332 dower and curtesy rights, 33
3
intermediate estates,334 and trust property.335
The rules for distributing the decedent's property interests are com-
parable from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In most jurisdictions, the statutes
do not permit a slayer to benefit from his or her wrongdoing and treat the
slayer as predeceasing the decedent.336 Forjoint tenancies and tenancies by
the entireties, the statutes sever the relationships so that the decedent's
heirs inherit or take the property that would have gone to the slayer by
right of survivorship.337 These provisions appear most frequently in the
Uniform Probate Code jurisdictions and are used by other jurisdictions
who have only broadly stated statutes. As such, they help fulfill the
Uniform Probate Code's goal of increasing the transferability of property
interests and the expeditious closing of estates.338 Other examples include
Idaho's provisions that distribute remainders, reversions, and powers of
appointment to the decedent's estate or to qualified third parties. 339 Also,
Indiana provides that property which would have been taken by a slayer be
placed in a constructive trust."'
326. Id.
327. See the Alaska, Hawaii, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
and Utah statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
328. See the New Mexico statute, cited in note 216 supra. Washington's statute also contains a
provision on future interests.
329. See Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49
HARV. L. REv. 715 (1936).
330. See, e.g., the Idaho, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
and Washington statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
331. Id.
332. See the Idaho, Iowa, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Dakota
statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
333. See the Arkansas, Oregon, and Rhode Island statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
334. See the Connecticut statute, cited in note 216 supra.
335. See the Oregon statute, cited in note 216 supra.
336. See, e.g., the Alaska, California, and North Carolina statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
337. See, e.g., the Connecticut, Hawaii, and New Jersey statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
338. See note 237 supra.
339. See the Idaho statute, cited in note 216 supra.
340. See the Indiana statute, cited in note 216 supra.
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CHART V. TYPE OF PROPERTY
Number of Jurisdictions:
Provision
General
Joint Tenancy-slayer &
decedent
-slayer, decedent,
third party
Tenancy by Entirety
Property Subject to Power of
Appointment
Exercise of Power of
Appointment
Statutory Share
Dower/ Curtesy
Intermediate Estate
Trust Property
Interest to be Divested
Interest Subject to a Class
Remainder
Vested Remainder
Vested Remainder or Reversion
with Life Estate in Third Person
Contingent Remainder
Reversion
Executory Interest
Remainder Subject to a Power
of Appointment
Community Interest
Future Interest
Total
38
UPC Other
12 26
22 12 10
5
8 3
16 12 4
Unlike these provisions are those in North Carolina, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Washington, states that have
adopted parts of the Wade Model. According to their statutes, part of the
property interests held jointly, by the entireties, or that are to be divested
are held by the slayer for life and then transferred to the decedent's
estate.34' Similarly, vested remainders or reversions with a life estate in a
third party are transferred to the decedent's estate or to a third party to
hold for the decedent's life expectancy. 342 Regular reversions are also
transferred to the decedent's estate or heirs for a period equalling the
decedent's life expectancy. 343 Clearly, such complicated provisions can
lead only to confusion and a prolonged probate process.
341. See, e.g., the Washington statute, cited in note 216 supra.
342. See, e.g., the North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island statutes, cited in
note 216 supra.
343. Id.
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In sum, the jurisdictions having statutes that address the problem of
murdering heirs are diverse in structure and approach. Some statutes are
general in scope and language. Others provide specific rules for a myriad of
contingencies. Three general approaches do appear. Twelve states have
adopted the UPC's section 2-803, which includes both general and specific
provisions but which distributes the decedent's property quickly and
efficiently by providing that the slayer is deemed to have predeceased the
decedent. Several states have adopted, in part, the Wade Model, which
also includes general and specific provisions. Instead of the UPC, however,
these statutes include many more contingencies concerning interested
parties, the form of the transfer, and especially the type of property
involved. In addition, the Wade Model may cause problems by measuring
the length of time an heir can hold property by the decedent's life ex-
pectancy and by specifying other rules that may lengthen the period of
probate for the decedent's estate. Finally, the majority ofjurisdictions have
opted either to maintain or amend their previously enacted statutes, which
are mostly short and broadly stated. As a result, the statutory law in the
United States lacks uniformity in structure and, to a certain extent, in
content and substance. Finally, the Wade Model and the UPC section have
not been widely adopted, raising the question that they may not adequately
address the issues and needs of the state legislatures and the possibility that
an alternative to them is necessary.
VIII. PROPOSED STATUTORY SCHEME
Any proposed statutory scheme seeks to effectuate a jurisdiction's
public policy. Unlike courts, legislative bodies do not examine its citizens'
behaviors in a piecemeal, case-by-case manner. Instead, a legislature is
uniquely equipped to determine and promulgate rules and guidelines
through research, study, public hearings, and debate.344 These rules give
notice to citizens about their required behavior. They also provide guid-
ance to the jurisdiction's court system concerning the standards it should
apply when faced with a situation falling within the legislation.
More specifically, a statute on murdering heirs should seek to fulfill
the public policy that no person shall benefit from his or her own wrong-
nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria145 The statute
should also attempt to fulfill the decedent's intent-that his or her murder-
er should not inherit or otherwise benefit from the murder. Because these
two goals are universal among the jurisdictions within the United States,
uniformity is also a goal. Thus, like the Uniform Probate Code, a proposed
344. McGovern, Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. REV. 65, 107 (1969). See
Anstine v. Hawkins, 92 Idaho 561, 563, 447 P.2d 677, 679 (1968).
345. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49
HARV. L. REV. 715, 715 (1936).
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statutory scheme should identify those desirable rules for uniform adop-
tion.346
The proper role of the legislature vis-A-vis the judiciary is central in the
development of any statute, especially one based, as here, on a combina-
tion of property rights and the criminal law. In either context, complex and
lengthy statutes are the norm. When combined, legislators and legal
writers have the understandable urge to try to provide rules and guidelines
for every conceivable situation that may arise. Legislators will also add
amendments from time to time to address new situations they have over-
looked or to answer a court's narrow interpretation that they believe is
unjustified.347 Complex and poorly drafted statutes may result from this
tinkering.
The reason for this confusion and legislative tinkering is the judi-
ciary's reluctance to judicially legislate exceptions to rules promulgated by
a legislature. For example, the Kansas Supreme Court stated that because
the statute, "in plain language," had set forth the conditions for disinherit-
ance, it could not justifiably minimize the conditions nor read different
conditions into the statute.348 Other courts have agreed when they have
asserted that because the statute was on a particular subject,349 or included
express and unambiguous language,350 it could not enlarge the legislative
intent by judicial interpretation. Finally, courts also restrictively interpret
the statutes when they consider the statute to be penal in nature and
therefore must be strictly construed.35'
Examples of this judicial behavior appear throughout the United
States. In Illinois, 52 Idaho,353 and Virginia, 354 for example, because the
murdering heirs were convicted only of voluntary manslaughter and not
murder, as required by the statutes, the courts allowed them to benefit
from their actions. In North Carolina, the court, interpreting the statute,
allowed the murdering wife to hold a life estate in one-half of the estate by
the entireties and awarded the remainder to the husband's heirs.355 Anoth-
346. Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN. L. REV.
453, 475-76 (1970).
347. See notes 245-48 and accompanying text supra.
348. Hogg v. Whitham, 120 Kan. 341,342,242 P. 1021, 1022 (1926). In this case, the court ruled
that a finding of guilty by a coroner's jury was not a conviction within the meaning of the statute and
thus allowed the murderer to inherit. Id. at 343, 242 P. at 1022.
349. In re Estate of Emerson, 191 Iowa 900, 906, 183 N.W. 327,329 (1921). Because the statute
dealt with only a murdering surviving spouse, the court allowed a son who killed his mother to inherit.
350. Rose v. Rose, 79 N.M. 435, 437, 444 P.2d 762, 764 (1968).
351. Blanks v. Jiggetts, 192 Va. 337, 342, 64 S.E.2d 809, 812 (1951).
352. In re Estate of Coslet, 39 Ill. App. 3d 305, 307, 349 N.E.2d 499, 501 (1976). Cf. In re
Buehnemann's Estate, 25 Ill. App. 3d 1003,324 N.E.2d 97 (1975) ("murder" was interpreted to include
voluntary manslaughter).
353. Anstine v. Hawkins, 92 Idaho 561, 563, 447 P.2d 677, 679 (1968).
354. Life Ins. Co. v. Cashatt, 206 F. Supp. 410, 412-13 (E.D. Va. 1962).
355. Homanich v. Miller, 28 N.C. App. 451, 455, 221 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1976).
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er North Carolina court allowed a murderer to inherit because a district
court judge's finding of wilfulness in the murder was not a conviction as
required under the statute.35 6 And, in Oregon, the court was forced to
legislate judicially when a son killed his father and the statute required the
property to go to the decedent's other heirs.357 Because no other heirs
existed, the statute could not be applied and the court looked to the state's
statute on escheat. This statute, however, did not apply because the
decedent did have a sister and property would escheat only when there
were no lineal descendants or kindred. Therefore, the court gave the
property to the sister, creating a wholly new rule of descent in Oregon.358
Nevertheless, some states have broadly interpreted narrowly written
statutes to effectuate the public policy. In Arkansas, courts have interpret-
ed the word "spouse" to include a beneficiary of insurance proceeds who
wrongfully killed her husband359 and a son who killed his parents.360
Another example appeared in California in a case in which the court read
broadly the statute to include a plea of nolo contendere to disinherit the
slayer.3
61
Although some states may broadly interpret the statutory language,
many others will not. A solution is needed to help courts and legislatures as
well as attorneys and their clients. Other proposed statutes have attempted
to provide such a solution. The Wade Model and section 2-803 of the
Uniform Probate Code partially succeed, but problems with their schemes
remain.
Those jurisdictions that have adopted all or parts of the Wade Model
do include two provisions to solve the judicial interpretation problem. One
section is broadly written to prohibit "the slayer nor any person claiming
through him" to "acquire any property or receive any benefit as the result
of the death of the decedent. 362 According to Wade, this provision seeks
"to cover every situation that may arise." 363 A second provision more
directly guides courts. This section declares that the statute should not be
considered penal in nature but should be construed broadly to effect the
public policy of preventing a person from benefiting from a wrongdoing.
364
Similarly, section 2-803 of the Uniform Probate Code contains a section
dealing with "any other acquisition of property" 365 and directs courts to
treat the claiming slayer as the other sections direct.
356. Lofton v. Lofton, 26 N.C. App. 203, 209, 215 S.E.2d 861, 865 (1975).
357. In re Norton's Estate. 175 Or. 115, 117, 151 P.2d 719, 720 (1944).
358. Id. at 123-24, 151 P.2d at 722. See also McGovern, Homicide and Succession to Property,
68 Mich. L. Rev. 65, 73 (1969).
359. Horn v. Cole, 203 Ark. 361, 367, 156 S.W.2d 787, 790 (1941).
360. Wright v. Wright, 248 Ark. 105, 108-09, 449 S.W.2d 952, 953-54 (1970).
361. In re McGowan's Estate, 35 Cal. App. 3d 611, 618, 111 Cal. Rptr. 39, 44 (1973).
362. See Wade, Acquisition ofPropertyby Willfully KillingAnother-A Statutory Solution, 49
HARV. L. REV. 715, 753 (1936).
363. Id. at 724.
364. Id. at 755.
365. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803(d).
[Vol. 41:905
MURDERING HEIRS
Both schemes also set forth other provisions specifically directing the
courts how to dispose of special types of property interests. If these general
provisions do cover all situations that may arise, however, the special
provisions are unnecessary. They are necessary only if a legislature doubts
the ability of the courts to solve special problems that may arise.
Instead, legislatures should realize that they cannot provide for every
possible situation that may arise. Legislatures should therefore enact only
general provisions and let the courts deal with the myriad types of prob-
lems that may arise. As legislatures are better equipped to handle general
policy guidelines to effectuate the public policy, courts are better equipped
to solve specific problems in light of statutory guidelines. Courts were
created and operate to give individualized treatment to problems and to
determine solutions on the basis of facts and arguments in a particular
case.366 Legislatures can and should state general policy. As one writer has
stated, a technical approach based on the "logical application of general
principles is preferable to solutions based on the vagaries of a badly drafted
statute.367
Whether the reluctance of legislatures to preempt the role of courts is
a reason to explain why neither the Wade Model nor section 2-803 has
been universally adopted is unclear. In any event legislatures have not
quickly adopted either approach. All or parts of the Wade Model have
been enacted in only seven jurisdictions.3 68 Similarly, section 2-803 has
been enacted by only twelve jurisdictions, 369 and some jurisdictions that
have enacted the Uniform Probate Code have either omitted370 or substan-
tially changed 371 section 2-803.
Legislatures may avoid both schemes for other reasons. The Wade
Model, especially, is long and complex. One particularly troublesome
section is the one onjoint tenancies. The section provides that one-half of
the decedent's estate passes to the decedent's estate and the other half
passes to the estate when the slayer dies.372 This provision thus keeps the
decedent's estate open for many more years than is necessary. A safeguard
is provided; a slayer can obtain a separation or severance or a decree
granting partition.373 But this is a separate step, requiring further legal
action at extra cost to both the claimant and extra administrative burden
to the courts.
366. See McGovern, Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 65, 108-09 (1969).
367. Id. at 110.
368. See the Idaho, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and
Washington statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
369. See the Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska,
New Jersey, North Dakota, New Mexico, and Utah statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
370. See, e.g., the South Dakota statute, cited in note 216 supra.
371. See, e.g., the Colorado, Idaho, and Nebraska statutes, cited in note 216 supra.
372. See Wade, Acquisition ofPropertyby Willfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49
HARV. L. RaV. 715, 753-54 (1936).
373. Id. at 754.
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Instead, the legislature, as suggested by the Uniform Probate Code,
can immediately sever the interest of the decedent "so that the share of the
decedent passes as his property and the killer has no rights by survivor-
ship. 374 The Uniform Probate Code solved the problem in one step
instead of two.
Other problems appear in section 2-803 of the Uniform Probate Code,
perhaps due to the long gestation of the Uniform Probate Code during
which compromises among various groups may have had to have been
made.375 Besides the apparent lack ot need to include separate sections for
intestate and testate succession, joint tenancies, and insurance benefits, the
requirement of a "felonious" killing as well as the role of a probate or other
civil court cause concern. First, by using the term "felonious," operation of
section 2-803 is limited to the criminal law definition of felony.3 76 In
addition, by requiring both a felonious and intentional killing, further
problems appear, especially regarding the crime of involuntary man-
slaughter. Although a jurisdiction's criminal law may consider involun-
tary manslaughter a felony, the element of intent is lacking in the crime of
involuntary manslaughter. A person guilty of involuntary manslaughter,
therefore, may be able to inherit even if that person's guilt was the result of
a plea bargain.377 Therefore, the Wade Model's requirement of a "wilful
and unlawful" killing may be better.
Finally, legislatures may object to the grant of power given noncrimi-
nal courts to determine a slayer's "guilt" by a preponderance of the
evidence before a final judgment of conviction in the criminal courts. 7
This provision does protect against situations in which a slayer commits
suicide after killing the decedent. Because some statutes require a convic-
tion, courts may not apply the statute and allow the slayer's heirs to benefit
from the wrongdoing. If, however, a slayer is acquitted in criminal court, a
probate court can still "convict" the slayer using only the standard of
preponderance of the evidence and deny him or her the inheritance.379
Therefore, the need for a new statutory scheme is apparent. Such a
scheme can borrow from the attempts made by Wade and the drafters of
the Uniform Probate Code. Specifically, provisions addressing innocent
third parties, the nature of the civil proceedings, the statute's construction,
and severability are important and should be maintained. More important
are the statements of general rules regarding the statute's application and
specifying how the property interest should be treated by the courts. The
following provisions are suggested.
374. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803(b).
375. See notes 235-36 and accompanying text supra.
376. Zartman, An Illinois Critique of the UPC, 1970 U. ILL. L. F. 413, 433-34.
377. In addition, accidental manslaughter, justifiable homicide and the defense of insanity are
not included within the meaning of Section 2-803. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL § 2.17
(1972).
378. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803(e).
379. Zartman, An Illinois Critique of the UPC, 1970 U. ILL. L. F. 413, 434.
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Section 1: Any person who wilfully and unlawfully causes the
death of another person shall not be entitled to receive or acquire
any interest in property as beneficiary or otherwise. This act
applies to any present interest, future interest, insurance policy,
contractual obligation, or other form of ownership. The slayer
shall be deemed to have predeceased the decedent. Property held
jointly will be severed so that the slayer shall not have rights by
survivorship and the decedent's share shall pass to his or her
other heirs.
This section has taken the best of both the Wade Model and section 2-
803, while recognizing the need to state general guidelines. As previously
explained, legislatures should provide only general guidelines, and courts
should be allowed to interpret these provisions to solve specific problems.
The intent, therefore, is for courts to interpret these provisions broadly.380
Specifically, "any person" can be broadly interpreted 311 to include any
of the interested parties indentified as part of most of the currently existing
statutory schemes.382 "Any person" can easily refer to a surviving spouse,
heir, devisee, joint owner, and beneficiary as well as to a parent who kills a
child and slayers who commit suicide. Similarly, the identification of
applicable property interests is also broad. Included could be the types of
property interests specified as well as any other type of interest, from
remainders to powers of appointment.
The phrase "wilfully and unlawfully" is used instead of "feloniously
and intentionally" to avoid the problem of the criminal law definition of
felony. Also, this proposed phrase avoids stating the many different
criminal actions, as done by many legislatures. Under this requirement, a
slayer must have intended to cause the death of the decedent and not have
acted lawfully. Therefore, a person who is guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter or not guilty by reason of insanity can receive or acquire a
property interest from the decedent.38 3 In addition, justifiable, excusable,
380. See discussion of Proposed Section 4, infra.
381. See, e.g., Bauman v. Hogue, 160 Ohio St. 296,116 N.E.2d 439 (1953). In this case, the court
interpreted "no person" to include a husband as surviving spouse. Id. at 299, 116 N.E.2d at 441.
The term "any" is, by its nature, broad in meaning. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cawthorne,
48 Cal. App. 3d 651, 121 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1975). Here, the court made "any" applicable to inheritance,
bequests, proceeds of insurance policies, and joint tenancies. Id. at 654, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 810. See
Bailey v. Retirement Bd., 51 111. App. 3d 433, 366 N.E.2d 966 (1977).
By using broad language such as "any," the legislative intent may be given a broad interpretation.
Linguistically, this intent is even more clear because the word "any" is general in nature. See Lawler,
An'y Questions, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 62 (1971); Lakoff, Some Reasons Why There Can't Be
Any Some-Any Rule, 45 LANGUAGE 608, 609 n.1 (1969).
382. See Appendix II infra and previous discussion of interested parties supra.
383. See, e.g., Davis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 279 F.2d 304(9th cir. 1960) (slayer allowed to recover
insurance benefits even though convicted of involuntary manslaughter); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Doane,
339 F. Supp. 1240 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ("wilful and unlawful" did not include involuntary manslaughter);
Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563 (1975) (involuntary manslaughter
not considered a wilful killing); Petrillo v. Hanely, 29 D.C. 512 (Pa. 1936) ("wilful and unlawful" does
not apply to a plea of insanity).
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and accidental homicides and homicides resulting from self-defense are
not included within the operation of this section.
3 84
After "wilfully and unlawfully," the section states that the slayer must
have "caused the death of another person." As with the word "any," the
word "cause" can be broadly construed. Therefore, legislatures do not
need to identify every type of criminal action, from murder, murder in the
first and second degrees, manslaughter, voluntary manslaughter, and
felony murder to participation in the slaying as a principal, accessory,
conspirator, or procurer. In addition, the section can apply whether the
slayer is brought to trial, pleads guilty, or pleads nolo contendere.
The treatment specified in the section is split between property inter-
ests owned totally orjointly by the decedent. For most property interests,
the slayer is deemed to have predeceased the decedent." 5 Property held
jointly, however, must be treated differently because of the law of survivor-
ship. If the slayer is deemed to have predeceased the decedent, the dece-
dent's estate will take both the decedent's and the slayer's share. Although
this results in no benefit to the slayer, legitimately held property interests
by a slayer should not be denied the slayer in contravention of the constitu-
tional prohibitions against forfeitures.386 Therefore, jointly held interests
are severed, the slayer retains ownership of his interest, and the decedent's
interest passes to his estate and not to the slayer.
Section 2: A final judgment of conviction of a wilful and unlawful
slaying is conclusive for purposes of this act. The record of the
slayer's conviction shall be admissible for or against a claimant of
a property interest in a civil proceeding under this act.
This section is taken from section 2-803 of the Uniform Probate Code.
It is appropriate and useful because it provides a mechanism for determin-
ing the transfer of property interests if a final judgment of conviction does
not occur. The requirement of a "final judgment" ensures that the fact of
the conviction will not be used in evidence until after all appeals are
exhausted.387 It also ensures that the question of the slayer's guilt or
innocence will not be relitigated during the civil proceeding. Unlike the
Wade Model, which merely states that the record of a conviction is
admissible,388 the Uniform Probate Code's section litigates only the ques-
384. See, e.g., Henry v. Toney, 211 Miss. 93,50 So. 2d 921 (1951) (wilful means anything wilful
and without justification); In re Pinder's Estate, 61 D.C. 193 (Pa. 1948) (wilful and unlawful does not
include the defense of self-defense). See also Bolich, Acts Barring Property Rights, 40 N.C. REv. 175,
193 (1962); Note, Decedent's Estate-Forfeitures of Property Rights by Slayers, 12 WAKE FOREsT L.
REV. 448, 450-51 (1976).
385. See McGovern, Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 MicH. L. REy. 65, 73 (1969).
386. The slayer should not have to forfeit what is his or hers. Porth v. Porth, 3 N.C. App. 485,
165 S.E.2d 508 (1969). See Oleffv. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935); Hamer v. Kinnan,
16 D.C. 395 (1931). See also, Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another-A
Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REv. 715, 728 (1936).
387. Tarlo's Estate, 315 Pa. 321, 172 A. 139 (1934); Blanding v. Sayles, 23 R. 1. 226,49 A. 992
(1901).
388. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49
HARV. L. REV. 715, 755 (1936).
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tion of the slayer's right to benefit from his or her wrongdoing.389 There-
fore, a civil court can investigate a transfer of property interests when a
technicality may have led to an acquittal or a reversal of a conviction.390
The second part of the section allows the record of the conviction to be
admitted into evidence for the civil proceeding. This is a statutory excep-
tion to the rule that such criminal records are not admissible in civil
proceedings to prove a person's guilt or innocence.39' This section helps to
carry out the legislative intent and recognizes the growing tendency of
courts to admit a criminal record in a civil proceeding unless excluded by
statute.392 The record would include the indictment, the jury's verdict, the
court's judgment and sentence, and any appeal of a court's decision.393
Section 3: This act does not affect the rights of any party who,
before rights under this act have been adjudicated, acquires from
the slayer for value and without notice an interest in property
that the slayer would have acquired except for the operation of
this act. The slayer is liable for the amount of the proceeds or the
value of the property interest. Any insurance company, financial
intermediary, or other obligor, making payment according to the
terms of its policy or obligation, is not liable under this act,
unless, prior to payment, it has received at home office or princi-
pal address written notice of a claim under this act.
Like section 2, this section also is taken from the Uniform Probate
Code.394 Besides grammatical changes to better state the propositions, the
only real change is the use of the word "acquires" for "purchases." "Ac-
quires" is a broader term and can be interpreted more generally. Also, the
term "financial intermediary" is substituted for "bank" and includes sav-
ings and loan associations, credit unions, and other organizations. The
operation of this type of section was upheld years ago by a court in
Oklahoma which ruled that a wife's heirs were entitled to the property
purchased with her funds by her husband who killed her.3 95
Section 4: This act shall not be considered penal in nature. The
provision of this act shall be construed broadly to effect the
policy of this state that no person shall be allowed to benefit from
his or her own wrong.
Section 5: The provisions of this act are declared severable. If any
389. In re Kravitz Estate, 418 Pa. 319, 329, 211 A.2d 443, 448 (1965).
390. Thus, the result in Barnes v. Cooper, 204 Ark. 118, 161 S.W.2d 8 (1942), would not have
occurred. In that case, although a wife killed her husband and then committed suicide, her heirs were
allowed to claim her dower rights because she was not convicted as required by the state's statute.
391. See, e.g., Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563 (1975).
392. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 412 Pa. 222,226,
194 A.2d 423,426 (1963). See Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932). See also
Note, Developments in the Law of Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818, 880 (1952).
393. See In re Kravitz Estate, 418 Pa. 319, 328, 211 A.2d 443, 448 (1965).
394. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803(f).
395. Exchange Trust Co. v. Godfrey, 128 Okla. 108, 261 P. 197 (1927).
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provision of this act, or its application to any person or circum-
stance, is held invalid, other provisions or applications shall not
be affected.
These two last sections are adopted from the Wade Model. Section 4
is the heart of this proposed statutory scheme. With this section, courts can
and should broadly construe all previous provisions to effectuate the
legislature's statement of public policy. This is proper because, as ex-
plained by Wade, this type of statute is not penal but equitable in nature;
rather than taking property from a person, a court is determining whether
that person should be allowed to acquire the property.396
CONCLUSION
Interrelated legal concerns are involved when courts, legislatures, and
legal practitioners confront the problem of a murdering heir. Substantive
criminal law defines the heir's actions toward the decedent. Property law
delineates the possession and transfer of property interests by the heirs and
decedents. Wills and trusts as well as insurance policies and contracts are
involved as law and equity courts attempt to solve resulting problems.
Throughout, courts and legislatures within the fifty states and the District
of Columbia must define their roles and the process to resolve these
problems.
In general, the law within the fifty-one American jurisdictions appears
to fulfill the concomitant public policies that a person should not profit
from a wrongdoing and that a decedent's intent should be manifested by
court action. Thus, courts should not allow a transfer of property to an
heir, devisee, joint owner, or beneficiary of any property interest who has
unlawfully and intentionally killed a decedent.
The courts and legislatures, however, have diluted, convoluted, and
confused the operation of the law. In somejurisdictions, a murderer will be
forbidden to inherit only if he or she was convicted. In otherjurisdictions, a
person convicted of voluntary manslaughter will be allowed to inherit.
And, in other jurisdictions, although the law prohibits heirs and devisees to
inherit, insurance beneficiaries who kill an insured will inherit.
The solution to this continuing confusion is simple. Either the courts
or the legislatures can resolve the issue and effectuate a clear statement of
public policy. Courts should have the courage to apply equitable principles
and public policy consistently. The judge in Riggs v. Palmer had this
courage-a courage to lead the legal community, the courage to apply
equitable principles to reach a more reasonable decision.
Courts, of course, are reluctant to use the power they possess. As co-
equal partners in government with the legislative branch, courts defer to
the legislature to create statutes stating the public policy and providing
396. See Wade, Acquisition ofPropertyby Willfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49
HARV. L. REv. 715, 751 (1936).
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guidelines to the courts. Therefore, the most meaningful forum for change
is the legislative.
Legislatures need to examine their currently existing statutes and how
they are being interpreted by the courts within thejurisdiction. If the courts
are reluctant to read exceptions into the statutes or to interpret the
statutory language broadly to include fact situations falling within the
public policy, the legislature must amend the statute. A workable statutory
solution would be one that is broadly stated and directs courts to broadly
interpret the statutory language. The statute should also provide for the
judicial process for determining the rights of the interested parties and
delineate the rights of innocent third parties. Only when the legislatures
begin to examine the act will this area of the law fulfill its legal purpose-to
prohibit wrongdoers from benefiting from their acts.
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APPENDIX I
PROPOSED STATUTORY SCHEME
Section 1: Any person who wilfully and unlawfully causes the death of another person shall not be
entitled to receive or acquire any interest in property as beneficiary or otherwise. This act applies to any
present interest, future interest, insurance policy, contractual obligation, or other form of ownership.
The slayer shall be deemed to have predeceased the decedent. Property held jointly will be severed so
that the slayer shall not have rights of survivorship and the decedent's share shall pass to his or her other
heirs.
Section 2: A final judgment of conviction of a wilful and unlawful slaying is conclusive for purposes of
this act. The record of the slayer's conviction shall be admissible for or against a claimant of a property
interest in a civil proceeding under this act.
Section 3: This act does not affect the rights of any party who, before rights under this act have been
adjudicated, acquires from the slayer for value and without notice an interest in property that the slayer
would have acquired except for the operation of this act. The slayer is liable for the amount of the
proceeds or the value of the property interest. Any insurance company, financial intermediary, or other
obligor, is not liable under this .act, unless, prior to payment, it has received at its home office or
principal address written notice of a claim under this act.
Section 4: This act shall not be considered penal in nature. The provisions of this act shall be construed
broadly to effect the policy of this state that no person shall be allowed to benefit from his or her own
wrong.
Section 5: The provisions of this act are declared severable. If any provision of this act, or its
application to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, other provisions or applications stall not be
affected.
1980]
A-Any person; any portion
AA-Aid and Abet
Ac-Accessory
AcBF-Accessory before the fact
Acci-Accidents
AFC-Accusation found calumnious
Ag-Acquittal in conclusive evidence
An-Annuity
Att-Attempt to kill
B-Beneficiary
Bd-Bond
BO-Benevolent organization
Brd-Broadly construe
C-Conviction is conclusive evidence
CF-Capital felony
Ch-Child; children
CL-Common law determines
outcome
CP-Community property
CR-Creditor's rights to property
Cs-Cause; Cause death
Csp-Conspiracy
CsSui-Cause suicide
CT-Constructive trust
D-Devisee; decedent
DU-Declaration of unworthiness
Eq-Equity determines outcome
Es-Estate
F&I-Feoniously, intentionally
F-I-Felony I
F-2-Felony 2
FDM-Failure to denounce murderer
FM-Cause death during commission
of felony
G-General Prop.
H-Heir
Hb-Husband
I-Intent
Ins-Insured
iT-Joint tenants
K-Kill
KL-Killer liable
LE-Life expectancy
LI-Life insurance
M-Murder
M-I-Murder, first degree
M-2-Murder, second degree
MSL-Manslaughter
Mtg -Mortgage
Mx-Mixed property
n-Not entitled
N-Notice
NA-Not affect rights
NBMJ-Not bring murderer to justice
NC-Nolo contendere
NCB-No corruption of blood
O-Other
OH-Other heirs
P-Predeceased
Pd-Pardoned
PE-Preponderance of the evidence
Pens-Pension
PG-Plea of guilty
PL-Personal property
PNL-Penal
"PNL-Not penal
Pr-Principle
Pro-Procure
PS-Profit sharing
Pt-Part or share
R-Real property
RdAdm-Record of conviction
admissible
RE-Real estate
Res-Restitution
S-Severance
SD-Self defense
Sen-Sentenced
Si-Situs of real property
SL-Slayer
Sp-Surviving Spouse
T-Trust; proceeds placed in trust
TE-Tenant by entirety
Val if no Fd-Valid if no fraud
Vd-Void
VM-Voluntary manslaughter
W&U-Wilful and unlawful
WF-Wife
2d-Second or secondary
3d-A third person
MURDERING HEIRS
APPENDIX II
ANALYSIS OF CURRENTLY EXISTING
STATUTORY SCHEMES
KEY
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
APPENDIX II
ANALYSIS OF CURRENTLY EXISTING
STATUTORY SCHEMES
Jurisdiction
ALA.
ALAS.
ARIZ.
ARK.
CAL.
Statutory
Scheme
None
UPC
UPC
single
Single
COLO. UPC
CONN. single
DEL.
D.C.
FLA.
GA.
HAW.
IDAHO
ILL.
IND.
IOWA
KAN.
KY.
LA.
ME.
MD.
MASS.
MICH.
MINN.
MISS.
None
multiple
single
multiple
UPC
multiple
multiple
single
single
single
single
multiple
none
single
None
UPC
UPC
multiple
Year Enacted Construction
1972
1974
1939
1905; am. 1931,
1955, 1963
1973
1965; am. 1967,
1971
1965
1973
1952
1976
1971
1939
1953; am. 1978
1963
1939; am. 1970
1804, 1808, 1825;
am. 1870
1809; am. 1888,
1904, 1912, 1924,
1939, 1951
1978
1975
1892; am. 1917,
1942
Interested Parties
Parent
Kills Slayer
Generally Child Suicide
Sp;H;D;Jt;B
Sp;H;D;Jt;B
Sp
A
Sp;H;D;Jt;B
A
A
A
A
Sp;H;D;Jt;B
PNL;Brd A
A
A
A;B
A
H;Hb;Wf;B;Jt
A
Sp;H;D;Jt;B
Sp;H;D;Jt;B
A
MO. None
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BFPV Obligors
Criminal
Action
Probate
Exclusions Court Recording
NA;KL NA;N F&L;K
NA;KL NA;N F&I;K
K;M-1;M-2
M;VM;FM;U&I;Cs
K;PG;NC;M-1
NA;KL NA;N M-2;MSL
Pr;Ac;M
F;M;MSL
NA;N
NA;KL NA;N
NA;KL NA;N
NA
Val if no
Fd;Mtg-NA
M C
I;K;Csp;Pro Acci;S;D C
F&I;K;M;VM C;PE
W&U;K;Pr;AcBf C;RdAdm
M C
M;VM;CsSui C
F;K;Cs;Pro
F;K;Pro C
K C
Pd;K;Att;NBMJ; D forgives C;DU;Oh
AFC;FDM sue
NA;KL NA;N F&I;K;AA
NA;KL NA;N F&I;K
NA W;Cs;Pro
C;PE
C;PE
C;PE
C;PE
C
C;Aq
C;PE
C
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Statutory
Scheme
UPC
UPC
single
None
UPC;single
UPC
none
multiple
Year Enacted
1975
1974
1945
Construction
1975; 1963
UPC 1975
Single 1975; am. 1976
single 1915; am. 1963,
1975
multiple
multiple 1941; am. 1947,
1972
multiple 1962
single 1924; am. 1932,
1942, 1952, 1962
multiple 1937; am. 1939,
1976
single 1976
multiple 1955; 1951
UPC 1975
single 1787; am. 1971
single 1950; am. 1962,
1968
multiple 1955; am. 1967
single 1931
None
single 1915; am. 1920,
1931, 1945, 1957
T NL
PNL
PNL; Brd
Interested Parties
Parent
Kills Slayer
Generally Child SuicideJurisdiction
MONT.
NEB.
NEV.
N.H.
N.M.
N.J.
N.Y.
N.C.
A
B
SP;H;D;Jt;B
A
A
T
A
A;B
N.D.
OHIO
OKLA.
ORE.
PA.
R.I.
S.C.
S.D.
TENN.
TEX.
UTAH
VA.
VT.
WASH.
W. VA.
WIS.
WYO.
Sp;H;D;Jt;B
Sp;H;D;Jt;B
A
Sp;H;D;Jt;B
Sp;H;D;Jt;B
A
Sp;H;D;Jt;B
A
A
A
A
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BFPV Obligors
NA;KL NA;N
NA;KL NA;N
Criminal
Action
,F&I;K
F&I;K;AA
M
NA;KL NA;N F&I;K;M;CF;F-I;
F-2
NA;KL
NA;KL;T
NA;KL
NA;KL
NA;KL;T
NA;KL;T
NA;N I;K
NA;N PrAcBF;W&U;PG;
NC;Pro;K;Die/Sui
NA;N F&I;K
PG;M;VM
I;NA;N M-I;M-2;MSL-I;
K;Cs;Pro
I;NA;N I;K;Pro
NA;N PrAcBF;W&U;K
NA;KL;T NA;N W&U;K;Pro
U;K
I;U;K;Pro
K;Consp;Pro
W;Cs;PrAc
R&I;K
NA;N M
K;I&U
NA;KL NA;N PrAcBF;W&U;K
F;K;Csp
Probate
Exclusions Court Recording
C;PE
C;PE
C
C;PE
C;PE
C;RdAdm
C;PE
C
C
C;PE
C;PE
RdAdm
C
RdAdm
C;Sen
C;PE
C
C;RdAdm
RdAdm
Acci;SD
NA;N F;K;Cs;Pro
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Forms of Transfers
Jurisdiction Intestate Wills
ALA.
ALAS. n;P n;P
ARIZ. n;P n;P
ARK.
CAL. n;P
COLO. n;P n;P
CONN. n n;P
DEL.
D.C. n;P n;P
FLA. n;P n;P
GA. n'P
HAW.
IDAHO
ILL.
IND.
IOWA
KAN.
Contracts Deeds Generally
Bd;LI;O;n;P
Bd;LI;O;n;P
Bd;LI;O;n;P
B;n;P
I;Vd
I:M'VM;Cso;PG; n;P
n;OH
n;P Bd;LI;O;n;P
n;P LI;Es or2dB
Vd;P
n;OH n;OH I;n
n n
A;n;P
R;PL;MX;O;n;P
R;PL;CP
A;n;P
A;CT
A
n;OH
n
MASS.
MICH.
MINN.
MISS.
n;OH I;n;OH
n
n;P B;LI;O;n;P
n;P B;LI;O;n;P
n;Vd;P
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Property
R;PL;n;P
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Property
Joint Tenancy
Statutory Tenancy by Intermediate
Share SL; D SL; D; 3d Entirety Dower/Courtesy Estate
n;S;G
n;S;G
n;S;G
n;R;PL
n;S;R;PL;O R;PL;O;n;P
n
n;OH
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Forms of Transfers
Intestate
n;P
n;P
Wills
n;P
n;P
Contracts
B;LI;O;n;P
B;LI;O;n;P
Bd;LI;O;n;P
Bd;LI;O;n;P
Jurisdiction
MONT.
NEB.
NEV.
N.H.
N.M.
N.J.
N.Y.
N.C.
P LI;JtLI; to D's
Es if D=B
P LI;P; to D's Es
if D=B
n;Es I;n;Es
P
n
LI;n;DH
B;LI;n;P;D
LI;n;P
n;P n;P
n;P n;P I;n;P
n;OH n;OH I;n;OH
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Other
Deeds Generally Property
n;P
n;P
A;n;O
R;PL;MX
R;PL
A;n;CT
A
A;n
A;n;R;PL
R;PL;n
n R;PL;Int;n
A;Pt;R;PL
NCB
A;Pt;n
A;n;P
R;PL
n;P n;P I;An;P; to D's
Es if D=B
n;P n;P Bd;LI;O;n;P
I;n;P;CT
n;OH n;OH I;n;OH
P P LI;Pens;PS;BO;2d
B or D's Es; to
D's Es if D=B
OHIO
OKLA.
ORE.
PA.
R.I.
S.C.
S.D.
TENN.
TEX.
UTAH
VA.
VT.
WASH.
W. VA.
WiS.
WYO.
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Property
Joint Tenancy
Statutory Tenancy by Intermediate
Share SL; D SL; D; 3d Entirety Dower/Courtesy Estate
S;K's share
to D at
death;CR
D's pt. to D's
Es; SL's pt to
SL for life
1/2 to D, 1/2
to SL
1/2 to SL for To SL for life
life, then then to 3d
to D's H.
1/2 to SL for To SL for life
life then then to D's Es
to D's H
1/2 to D's Es, To D's Es; or
1/2 to SL for OJT; or 1/2 to
life, then D's Es and 1/2
D's Es to SL for life
then to D's Es
1/2 to SL for
life then to
D's H
1/2 to D's Es; P
1/2 to SL for
life, then
to D's Es
1/2 to D's Es;
1/2 to D's Es
at SL's
death
1/2 to D's Es; to D's Es; or
1/2 to D's Es 1/2 to D's Es
at SL's death and 1/2 to D's
Es at SL's death
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Trust Interest to Interest Subject Vested
Jurisdiction Property Be Divested To Special Class Remainders Remainder
ALA.
ALAS.
ARIZ.
ARK.
CAL.
COLO.
CONN.
DEL.
D.C. n;P
FLA.
GA.
HAW.
IDAHO P VR=Es or ed;
ILL. CR=P
IND.
IOWA
KAN.
KY.
LA.
ME.
MD.
MASS.
MICH.
MINN.
MISS.
MO.
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Vested Remainder
or Reversion with Contingent
Le in 3d Remainder Reversion Executory Power of Appointment
n;P n;P
P;Es or class
1980]
Es or 3d
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Trust Interest to Interest Subject Vested
Property Be Divested To Special Class Remainders RemainderJurisdiction
MONT.
NEB.
NEV.
N.H.
N.M.
N.J.
N.Y.
N.C. to class D for D's
LE
to class
to class
to class
D's H for
D's LE
D's H for
D's LE
D's Es for
D's LE
to D's Es
for D's LE
N.D.
OHIO
OKLA.
ORE.
To SL for life
or D's LE
To SL for life
or D's LE
S.C.
S.D.
TENN.
TEX.
UTAH
VA.
VT.
WASH. to SL for life
or D's LE,
then P
To SL for
SL's life
W. VA.
WiS.
WYO.
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Vested Remainder
or Reversion with
Le in 3d
Contingent
Remainder Reversion Executory Power of Appointment
To 3d for D's LE
To 3d for D's LE
To Bd for D's LE
SL;P D for D's LE SL;P
D's H for D's
SL;P LE SL;P
D's Es for
P D's LE p
D's Es for
P D's LE
P to D's Es for
D's LE
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Present or Remainder
Subject to Power of Community Future
Jurisdiction Appointment or Revocation Estates Interests
ALA.
ALAS.
ARIZ.
ARK.
CAL.
COLO.
CONN.
DEL.
D.C.
FLA.
GA.
HAW.
IDAHO
ILL.
IND.
IOWA
KAN.
KY.
LA.
ME.
MD.
MASS.
MICH.
MINN.
MISS.
MO.
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Present or Remainder
Subject to Power of Community Future
Appointment or Revocation Estates InterestsJurisdiction
MONT.
NEB.
NEV.
N.H.
N.M.
N.J.
N.Y.
N.C.
N.D.
OHIO
OKLA.
ORE.
PA.
R.I.
S.C.
S.D.
TENN.
TEX.
UTAH
VA.
VT.
WASH.
W.VA.
WiS.
WYO.
to D's Es
to D's Es
to D's Es
to D's Es
to D's Es or class
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